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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
The aim of this study is to analyze the social processes leading
to the formation of the Residential Crime Prevention Committee (RCPC),
the social relations which developed within this committee and those
relations developing between the committee members and city officials.
It is seen as a contribution to the understanding of cooptation and
the situations and circumstances in which it might occur.

This study

seeks to place the evolution of the RCPC within a historical and
political situation where cooptation appears to be a viable social
process.
The Residential Crime Prevention Committee was first conceptualized
in a grant proposal written by the Evanston Police Department in 1979.
This prosposal was submitted to the Illinois Law Enforcement Commission
(ILEC) along with a request for funding for a three year period.

While

the study and analysis of crime prevention programs represents an
important area for sociological research, it is not the intention of
this study to either evaluate the crime prevention program developed by
the RCPC or compare it to other programs across the nation.
As it was originally conceived, the RCPC was an overt attempt
by the city police department to develop a working relationship between
the police department and the larger community.
1

Like the majority
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of contemporary urban areas, Evanston had experienced an increasing
crime rate which traditional methods of policing had been relatively
ineffective in combating.

This crime prevention grant called for the

concerted efforts of citizens and police to develop a crime prevention
program which met the needs and concerns of Evanston residents.
In the Fall of 1979, a new community group was formed which made
the rising crime rate their issue of central concern.

This community

organization chose to place the responsibility for this crime problem
squarely on the police department and on the chief of police as the
administrator of this department.

This group initially voiced its

concern through legitimately recognized channels such as communication
through the appropriate alderpersons or communication with the city
manager's office.

However. as the concerns of this group gained in

intensity, protests were communicated directly to the city manager's
office and the city council.

As the issues and demands were developed

and presented to city officials, these efforts were publicized and
legitimized by the local community newspaper.

Local mass media served

to add "fuel" to a small scale conflict between a community organization and city officials.
This conflictive situation eventually led to a highly publicized
controversy surrounding the competency of the police chief and the
police organization as a whole.

This controversy drew sufficient

public attention so that city officials felt a need to respond to the
charges and allegations against the department.
administration took a variety of directions.

Responses by the city

Three general modes of
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reaction can be delineated which are based on specific objects of
criticism.

The criticisms directed towards the Evanston Police Depart-

ment (EPD) were aimed at the administrative, the organizational and
the community levels.
While the original basis of the RCPC was a genuine desire to
develop cooperation between residents and police in the prevention and
solution of crime, it came_to have a new meaning with the development
of the police controversy.

This study hypothesizes that as the police

controversy gained in intensity, the RCPC became the object of cooptive
efforts by both city and police administration.

At the height of this

controversy in 1980, the RCPC was cited by city and police officials
as an example of the city's efforts to alleviate the crime problem.
This study seeks to investigate the possibility that the RCPC

~~a

as a means whereby community leaders (including the leaders of the
conflictive community group) would be "absorbed" into a connnittee
charged with the responsibility of developing a residential crime
prevention program which could be implemented on a city wide basis.
This committee involvement would, in all probability, direct attention
away from public criticism, and into a collaborative effort by citizens
and police.
Research Methods
The information presented in this study has been gathered by a
variety of research methods.

Information on the historical situation

in which the RCPC will be placed was gathered in two ways.

Initial

input and interest in the potential "cooptability" of the RCPC was the
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result of the author's full time employment in the police department
involved and as a member of the larger social network of which this
organization was a part.

Recognition of the RCPC as a potential source

of cooptation came to light as city and police officials took an increasing interest in the development of the RCPC.

The author was involved

in an official capacity in the planning and data collection of a residential burglary study conducted as part of the Comprehensive Crime
Prevention Program (CCPP).

This direct involvement with the crime prev-

ention grant coupled with interviews and discussions with other organizational members provided much of the detail of the broader situational
context of which the RCPC was part.

This information was supplemented

by a content analysis of local newspaper coverage of the crime controversy and its consequences.
The actual data concerning the social processes which both shaped
the RCPC and developed within the RCPC was gathered by three overlapping
methods.

First, the author's role as a participant observer in the

RCPC from the outset provided a cumulative analysis of the social
evolution of this committee.

The author was introduced as a researcher

interested in studying community groups in the first meeting.
was accepted without question.

This

This natural acceptance was partially

due to the fact that Evanston is comprised of a highly educated
citizenry and a larger number of people associated professionally
with Northwestern University.

Observations and notes were made at all

RCPC meetings which provided valuable insight into the interactions
between members and the Resource Committee.
provided a point of comparison over time.

These observations

5

Field observations were supplemented by in depth interviews
with community group leaders which comprise the committee and also
with representatives of the police department which comprise the
Resource Committee.

These interviews were conducted with a preconceived

set of questions which were open ended in nature.

As relevant issues

or points were discovered in each interview, these were incorporated
into subsequent interviews. Appendix A represents the topical format
utilized in these interviews.

These interviews provided a rich source

of insight into the social processes operating between committee members
and between community group leaders and their constituencies.

These

interviews were invaluable in assessing committee member's perceptions
of the degree of influence and control exerted by members of the Resource
Committee in the formation of RCPC policy.
A questionnaire was also administered to community leaders.

The

questionnaire, which is presented in Appendix B, had three functions.
First, it sought information on the background of the particular
community groups represented on the RCPC.

Second, it was designed to

ascertain information regarding the usual channels of "protest" employed
by these groups in the resolution of specific community problems.

Third,

the identification of a pre-existing cooperative network between community groups or between community groups and the police department
was also a major goal behind the administration of these questionnaires.
The analysis of documents distributed by the municipal government, the police department and the RCPC were also included in researching this problem.

These included such things as interoffice memo-
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orandums (both from the city manager's office and the chief of police),
the Managment Study of the police department and documents distributed
to and by the RCPC.
One last point concerning the collection of data with regard to
the RCPC is necessary here.

The author's role as a paid employee of

the police department was a valuable asset in collecting the necessary
data for this study.

Members of the Evanston Police Department and the

Residential Crime Prevention Committee have been most cooperative in
assisting my efforts in this collection and I wish to acknowledge that
cooperation.

CHAPTER II
REVIEW OF RELATED LITERATURE:

COOPTIVE MODELS

Cooptation was first introduced as a sociological process in
Philip Selznick's seminal work, TVA and the Grassroots (1949).

This

study is regarded as a classic study in both the formal and informal
processes developed within a complex organizational setting.

Having

intellectual roots in both Parsons and Michels, Selznick produced a
study done in the classic tradition of the structural-functionalist
school with the social and political critiques characteristic of
Michels.
Parsons' theoretical approach to the study of complex organizations represents an equilibrium model which treats the organization as
a natural system.

As social systems, organizations must meet function-

al imperatives in order to survive.

These functional imperatives become

tangible through the formal statement and the actual process of goal
attainment.

Thus organizations develop subsystems in order to solve

problems of adaption, achieve organizational goals, to coordinate and
integrate members' activities within the system and finally to maintain
consensus on legitimized values.

Within the natural system framework,

goal attainment is achieved by controlling the utilization of resources
and the processes by which these resources are mobilized.
7
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In Political Parties (1962) Michels focuses attention on the
internal processes of the organization, specifically with the process
of goal displacement.

For Michels, power is a major organizational

factor in the displacement of goals.

Bureaucratic structure within

the organization is a necessary element in the mobilization and distribution of resources.

However, for Michels this bureaucratic struc-

tures represents a system of political domination which arises from a
shift of power from the legitimate source of authority to the leaders.
Bureaucracy ceases to be merely an instrument of organization and becomes a tool whereby officials come to attain more power than necessary
for the performance of their legitimate tasks.

Michels' expectation

is that this will inevitably result in an abuse of power.

Michel's

"Iron Law of Oligarchy" assumes that organizational power will centralize in the hands of a few and will utimately result in the dislocation
of organizational goals.
Selznick was concerned with the actual process of goal attainment pursued by the TVA, and the political and practical means employed
to survive a potentially hostile local environment.

Also, basic to

this process were the TVA's efforts to retain its new found degree
of autonomy from the federal government.
basic questions:

Selznick was guided by two

"How were the abstractions of the "grassroots"

doctrine specified operationally, this is, how did they show up in the
actual course of decision-making"?(Selznick, 1949: xii).

In the true

Michelian approach, how did the TVA take an abstract ideology and
combine it with practical means aimed at achieving its goals? "What
effect did this operative conduct have on the moral posture and com-
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petency of the TVA as a government agency?" (Selznick, 1949: xii).
In other words, did the adaptive processes the TVA underwent in dealing with both its proximate environment and its position as an experimental governmental agency, and the process by which abstract ideals
were transferred into workable goals, compromise the democratic ideals
under which the TVA claimed to operate?

Selznick sought to show that

through its grassroots committments, the TVA came to be restricted in
its efforts to reach goal objectives.
Selznick was interested in the informal, even "pathological"
mechanisms of organizational survival.

In this pursuit, he was more

concerned with the informal interactions between the agency, its members, the federal government and other institutions in its area of
operation.
For Selznick the formal structures of an organization failed to
deal with and control the nonrational dimensions of organizational
behavior.

Selznick believed the informal structures which both the

leadership and membership created to closer approximate unmet needs,
were critically important in understanding goal attainment or lack of
goal attainment in organizations.
three basic kinds:

These informal structures were of

informal relationships (i.e. friendships, etc.)

ideologies, and cooptation.

It is the informal mechanism of cooptation

which is the concern of the present discussion.
In studying the informal mechanisms of organizational behavior,
Selznick was the first to introduce the sociological concept known as
cooptation.

Selznick's use of the term was unique in that his def-

10

inition of this "process" came to have negative political overtones
which is lacking in the strict dictionary definition of the word.
Webster defines coopt as "choosing or electing into a body or committee
by the votes of its own membership". {Webster's Dictionary, 1977: 87).
Selznick defined cooptation as "the process of absorbing new
elements into the leadership or policy determining structure of an
organization as a means of averting threats to its stability or existence". (Selznick, 1949: 13).

In studying the TVA, Selznick found

that in order to utilize existing local channels of communication and
ensure legitimacy in the local community, already existing organizations in the valley were approached for inclusion in the TVA's programs.
Selznick documents this process of assimilation and the consequences
of this cooptation in terms of the TVA's loss of total control over
the decision making and the diverson of future programs from organizational goals because of specific interest groups.
Selznick further delimited cooptation into two basic types.

For-

mal cooptation was employed when an organization needed to visibly absorb new elements into its ranks.

This is often accomplished by appoint-

ment of representatives of the perceived adversary to the board of
directors or an actual contractual agreement between two organizations.
Selznick identifies two conditions under which formal cooptation becomes
a viable choice.

The first pertains to a lack of legitimacy of the

coopting agency or the perceived lack of legitimacy.

The second con-

dition exists when a "self-governing" body finds it necessary to develop reliable channels of communication such as that between trade unions
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and the industrial business sector.

Informal cooptation is an option

appropriate as a response to specific centers of power in a community
and is characterized by an informal reciprocal relationships whereby
these informal demands go into shaping the structure and policy of the
institution under question.
While these two types of cooptation cannot be regarded as mutually
exclusive, their separation is useful in terms of analyzing the actual
or perceived "sharing of power" and the actual or perceived "loss of
power" on the part of formal authority.

Approached from either end,

cooptation represents a "tension between formal authority and social
power" (Selznick, 1949: 15) whereby formal authority strives to maintain legitimacy in the eyes of its public and the social power to make
decisions.
In an attempt to generalize this adaptive process, the remainder
of this chapter will examine the way in which subsequent writers have
dealt with the operationalization of cooptation, its generalizability
to other organizations or institutions and the way in which cooptation
has been distinguished from "participation" dominant in democratic
ideology.

The discussion will then proceed to a conceptualization of a

recent "power" struggle between a local municipal government and a
coalition of concerned citizens.
Economic/Market Structural Model
In reviewing other research dealing with the concept of cooptation, three separate areas of organizational domain can be identified.
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These models consist of the following:

the economic/market structural

model, the large scale social movement perspective and cooptation within
the local community power structure.
The economic/market structural model has been concerned with the
employment of cooptive techniques to lessen the "market constraints"
imposed both intra-organizationally and extra-organizationally.
type of research is typified by Burt (1980a;l980b).

This

Mathematical models

have been developed for use in predicting situations where cooptive
strategies will be more prevalent.
Burt (1980a) provides a unique measurement of structural autonomy
by a combination of two aspects of autonomy which have been treated
separately in the literature--autonomy via oligopoly and ·autonomy via
group-affiliation.

Burt essentially introduces a network concept of

autonomy where oligopoly is seen as "focusing on the relations among
structurally equivalent actors occupying a status" (Burt, 1980a: 900).
Burt thus defines high structural autonomy as being composed of three
characteristics:

1) in jointly occupying a particular position, there

is high centralization of this group of actors such that they form an
oligopoly 2) their relations to actors of other statuses are varied and
these other actors do not form oligopolies themselves and 3) the interaction effect of these two conditions.

Structural autonomy is then

used to hypothesize relationships where cooptive relations will appear
and not appear and where cooptation will lead to an actual increase in
autonomy.
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In an attempt to empirically demonstrate cooptive strategies
Burt treated manufacturing industries in the American economy in 1967
as structurally equivalent actors.

The profits of each industry as a

whole were used as a measure of the relative autonomy of firms in
separate industries.

High profits in turn were deemed an indication

of structural autonomy.

From these relations, Burt hypothesized that

cooptive strategies would be apparent in the merger patterns of firms-specifically that firms in an industry will purchase other firms in
attempts to "coopt" constraints placed on the industry's structural
autonomy.
Methodologically, Burt steps between two units of analysis.

It

is not clear whether the industry or the firm is his unit of analysis
or whether his hypothesis of cooptive strategies is believed to hold
true across firms in the same industry, across different industries or
both.
Conceptually, he relies on merger patterns as a cooptive strategy,
however, his assumption is that such a merger is a one way strategy
designed to enhance the position of the coopting firm.

This precludes

the possibility that the coopted firm has a vested interest in the
merger or for that matter that a "coopted" or "coopting" firm can even
be identified.

In essence, Burt has equated structural autonomy with

power itself, an assumption empirically unjustified.

Further, Burt

reduced the generalizability of the concept of structural autonomy to
be "most promising in a system where there is a clear separation of
formal from informal potentially cooptive relations" (Burt, 198Ca:923)--

14

a situation highly unlikely in most complex organizational relationship networks.

This again raises the issue of separating cooptive

strategies from mutually beneficial contractual agreements (collaboration).
In a second article exploring the use of corporate cooptive
strategies, Burt et al (1980b) focuses on directorate ties between
organizations as a cooptive strategy aimed at reducing market constraints
on profits.

Here the focus is on "establishment" as the unit of

analysis and this is consistently maintained throughout the entire
study.

The underlying assumption of this study is that interorganiza-

tional directoral ties is synonymous with cooptation.

Burt, et al

state that "cooptation is a rationalization for action without a
specification of parameters for action" (Burt, 1980b: 823).

This is

as close as the authors came to a working definition of cooptation.
This statement leaves us no closer to either an understanding of
cooptation nor a means for distinguishing it from other social processes
such as cooperation and negotiation.
Large Scale Social Movements
A second focus of cooptation research has been the cooptation
of specific social movements in the political arena on a broader
macro-level.

Eckstein (1976, 1977) re-conceptualizes Selznick's

definition of cooptation to account for the relative ineffectiveness
of various poor people's organizations in urban Mexico.

Eckstein

attempts to demonstrate use use of cooptation as a means of regulating
the poor and just what processes impede these coopted groups from

15

utilizing their formal power to benefit their own ends.

Eckstein

establishes a conceptual distinction between "cooptation" as an individual (adaptive) process (this term referring basically to organizational
leadership) and "incorporation" as a process of absorbing whole groups
of people.

She further maintains that these two processes do not

necessarily occur together nor do they necessarily take the same form.
In her study of organizations designed for the benefit of poor
urban Mexicans, Eckstein found that such groups had come increasingly
under the control of the ruling political party and had gradually ceased
to provide services independently of the government.

These groups,

many of which had originally been concerned only with particular social
issues, came to have the "general welfare" of these poor people as an
overarching ideological committment.

These groups came to be formally

associated with the prevailing political party and ruling class because
of the delivery of material benefits which they needed.

However, be-

cause of the absorption of these groups into the formal political
structure and subsequent threat of collective demands reduced, these
material gains were short-lived.

Formal absorption into the dominant

political arena imposed tactical restrictions on the forms which their
requests and demands for social justice could take.
no longer tolerated.

"Demands" were

"Requests" came to be presented on individual

terms rather than on a collective basis.

Further, group leaders became

less and less willing to engage in political demands because of their
interests in advancing their own political careers.

16
In their classic study of Poor People's Movements (1979), Piven
and Cloward state similar conclusions in their analyses of the unemployment worker's movements of the 30' and 40's, the industrial
worker's movement and the civil rights and welfare rights movements of
the 60's.

Piven and Cloward do not deal with a formally stated theory

of cooptation, however, the process which this concept represents plays
a major role in their theory of why poor people's movements usually
fail.

Their theory revolves around the tendency of movement leader-

ship to become more concerned with the day to day organization and
maintenance of the movement (including their own positions) and less
with the long range goals.

This deflection of energy from political

action or pressure (in their terms insurgency) and subsequent preoccupation for organization building, greatly reduces the material
and political gains which the threat of insurgency might elicit.

Piven

and Cloward criticize movement leaders (most particularly the radical
leaders of the left) for not taking full advantage of the demands to be
won by the full blown militancy or threat of militancy which a class
or sector of people possess.

Piven and Cloward attempt to distinguish

the social-historical conditions which shape a movement's course of
action and the organizational forms which develop within a movement which
either promulgate or thwart movement gains.

Admittedly in the tradition

of Michels, Piven and Cloward maintain that the "imperatives of massmembership organizational maintenance" (1979: xvi) characteristically
create an elite leadership which is prone to the process of cooptation
either by efforts to secure financial/political stability for the
organization or by efforts to secure these gains for themselves.
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Dealing exclusively with social movements seeking both immediate and
long term social changes, Piven and Cloward maintain that intensive
efforts at organization enable the political elite to absorb leaders
either by offering them paid positions or by neutralizing the political
clout of their "insurgency".

By making demands/negotiations a rational,

organized procedure-- the ruling class is then in a position to predict
the behavior of movement members.
On a somewhat smaller scale, similar conditions were reached in a
study of the Umoja Federation, a women's group formed during the
colonial era in Western Kenya.

Staudt(l980) found that the local

autocratic chief (male) and his administrative staff were instrumental
in organizing and legitimizing a local women's group.

The chief was

responsible for reducing soil erosion and land c9nsolidation for subsequent land registration.

Since women were traditionally responsible

for agriculture and boundaries were to be maintained by euphorkin bushes,
the chief actively sought the mobilization of women in these efforts.
Leaders were "coopted" from women already recognized and respected in
the community.

These female leaders were given the added responsibility

of judging the behavior of their consituencies.

Staudt thus attributes

the "cooptation" of the female leaders into the male power structure,
as a major factor in the subsequent demise of the organization and
dissaffection of the membership base.
Finally, a recent article by Bielasiak (1980) explored the
change in the recruitment of leaders in the communist bloc countries
of Eastern Europe (1954-1971).

Bielasiak documented an unprecedented
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increase in the recruitment of "expert knowledge" as opposed to the
recruitments of young people into "career" lines within the communist
party.

Typically, the cooptation of experts into the existing

communist regime, occurred at later stages in these experts' careers,
indicating this as the communist government's solution to a pressing
need for expert technical, economic or political knowledge not
possessed by party members in power.

In other words, these experts

were coopted into providing the regime with the technology it needed
to survive in a highly complex "post-industrial" society without the
dissemination of power characteristic of a "career" party member.

The

Soviet Union was found to have "coopted" a significantly larger percentage of officials than had other communist bloc countries such as
Poland or Rumania.

Bielasiak attributes this to the greater stability

of the communist regime in the Soviet Union and the resultant "greater
pool of trustworthy non-political elite" groups.

Bielasiak's study

represents an interesting application of the cooptive process to a
national political regime and the implications of this cooptation
for political survival of the ruling elite.
As can be seen by the variety of environmental situations cited
in the above section, cooptation has been utilized at the societal
level in a number of ways.

In Eckstein's study of poor urban Mexicans,

cooptive measures were employed by the national political party to limit
the strong influence of the Catholic Church and the individual power of
local officials in both the political and economical arenas.

Piven

and Cloward have attributed the diffusion of political power of the
power classes in the United States to the inclination of movement lead-
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ers to concentrate too many resources on organizing rather than on
incidents of insurgency.

The political elite subsequently take ad-

vantage of the survival needs of these organizers/organizations by
coopting the leadership of such movements.
Bielasiak demonstrated the use of cooptive strategies employed
by communist bloc countries in order to incorporate certain levels
of expertise and knowledge into the party framework without relinquishing any actual power.

Studies in the social movement perspective

are indicative of the innumerable ways that cooptation can be utilized
as a source of power and influence in reinforcing the dominate ideology
and maintaining the social control of the ruling class.
Local Power Structure Model
The third area which the cooptive process has been documented
has been in the realm of local community power struggles.

Seiler, et

al (1979) accumulated reputational leadership data to identify persons
having the greatest impact on community life following the location of
a major steel mill in that community.

Seiler, et al found that repu-

tationally, the steel mill officials were not seen as playing a major
role in effecting community decisions or developments.

However, the

authors maintain that the steel mill actually had a great deal of impact on community affairs by using a combination of three strategies.
The three types of corporate strategies were unilateral action, cooptation, and intervention.

Unilateral techniques involved direct but

subtle action on the part of the corporation.

This technique was

typified by the fact that the corporate officers of the steel mill kept
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their intentions of locating the steel mill within the community from
public knowledge until significant portions of community land had been
acquired.

The company also actively prevented a population explosion

from occurring (a situation which would have significantly raised their
taxes to provide the additional community services required by such an
influx of people) by actively seeking job applicants from surrounding
communities within a 50 mile radius.
The use of cooptation was exemplified by the procurement of services from at least five of the most prominent reputional and positional
leaders in the county for the steel mill.

While the corporation was

adamant about keeping the steel mill personnel out of active participation in the community, it made members of the community a part of the
steel mill.

"Thus, cooptation was a "one-way street" and were conflicts

of interest to occur, community residents would be in the middle, not
J

& L executives" (Seiler, 1979: 381).
Intervention was a third techinque utilized by the corporation

in looking out for its "economic interests" in the community.

This

technique was typified by J & L's retention of a consulting firm to
design a new high school for the community when it became apparent that
the elaborate design proposed by citizens would significantly raise the
tax needs of the county.
The lack of inclusion of J & L executives in the reputational
community leadership data indicated that the corporation was successful, through a combination of techniques, of concealing its own involvement in guiding community affairs.

In this case, as in many of the
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previous studies, it appears that it is organizationally more
efficient to manipulate the environment than rearrange the organization itself.
Research in this theoretical model has also approached the process
of cooptation as a political strategy of local citizen groups in their
attempt to realize concessions from local officials.

Galaskiewicz

(1981) attempted a study in the pluralist tradition by testing two
basic models of citizen participation.

These models are 1) the

cooptation model and 2) the intimidation model.

This study attempted

to distinguish the variables which made either strategy more successful or more desirable for the interest group.
dent variables were used:

Three main indepen-

1) size of the interest group 2) the previous

experience of interest group in political affairs and 3) socioeconomic status of interest group.

The intervening variable was access -

the degree of interpersonal contact with city officials.

Galaskiewicz's

conclusions appear to support Piven and Cloward's assertion that lower class movements tend to lose their political "clout" when the threat
of insurgency is less, and negotiation is a more dominant strategy.
He found that larger, less experienced and lower socioeconomic status
groups had better access to city officials, but it was the larger,
more experienced and higher status groups which had more success in
pursuing their group interests.
The three focal points of recent research on the process of
cooptation represent the diverse way in which cooptive strategies may
be utilized, the unique way individual researchers have of conceptual-
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izing and measuring cooptation and perhaps even the pervasiveness
of the process as a strategy in everyday life.

The one element which

many of these studies has in common, is their view of cooptation as
an aggressive strategy of both interest groups and organizations in
dealing with stability issues such as resource acquisition and allocation, the use of expert knowledge and increased political clout.

None

of the above cited studies deals with the other possibility raised by
Selznick--cooptive strategies as a response aimed at diverting public
attention away from specific community concerns.

Previous research

has primarily been concerned with "preventing" legimitimacy or power
crises from occurring.
The potentially cooptive situation investigated in the present
study differs from the three basic models in several ways.

The

economic/market structure model represents a quantifiable model which
attempts to predict when a cooptive strategy will be employed.

This

model deals exclusively with cooptation in the corporate business
setting.

Burt•s (1980a; 1980b) corporate model is not one which can

be easily transferred to other social situations.

His measurement of

structural autonomy and merger patterns do not allow the prediction
of cooptation outside the corporate structure.

While it is useful to

study situations where cooptation is utilized as a social process
and attempt to predict from such a model, it must be emphasized here
that cooptation is not always the result of an intention strategy.
Evanston represents a case where the RCPC was conceptualized without
the intention of cooptation but may have been the object of cooptive
strategies as a consequence of the police controversy.
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Piven and Cloward's study of Poor People's Movements (1979),
provides a helpful analysis of particular resources available to social
movements.

Their emphasis on insurgency or the threat of insurgency

is a helpful way of analyzing the main resource available to the Marywood Neighbors Association in Evanston.

While the Evanston group can

in no way be considered a poor people's movement, the vocalization
of their concerns and demands in both the media and council meetings,
placed the reform government in a defensive position.
Bielasiak's study (1980) of the communist party's cooptation of
"experts" into their government was helpful in pointing out a broader situation where cooptive strategies might be utilized.

However,

this particular situation differs from the case at hand because the
"coopted" individuals possess expertise needed by the "coopting"
group.

In the case of Evanston, the Resource Committee as represent-

atives of the police/city administration, were the ones with the
expert knowledge.

They were therefore charged with the responsibility

of passing this knowledge on to the RCPC.
The local power structure model is the basic model from which
the Evanston case will be analyzed, however, studies in this framework have differed in terms of the specific object of cooptation.
Seiler (1979) identified cooptation as a strategy employed by a steel
mill which was attempting to "ease" into a new community and exert
some control over the community development which might effect company
profits or policy.

In this case the steel mill's addition to the

community represented a similar situation to Selznick's (1949) study
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of the TVA.

The steel mill "anticipated" certain problems which

might arise in the community because of their arrival and attempted
to alleviate them by a variety of methods, one of which was cooptation.
However, unlike the TVA, the steel mill was careful to exert their
influence in a manner which could not be visibly traced.

This

strategy prevented the "compromise" of basic organizational principles
which Selznick identifies with the TVA.
The "object" of cooptation in Galaskiewicz's (1981) study,
represents a reversal of most other studies.

This study attempts

to identify situations where a citizen's interest group might utilize
cooptation to exert influence on a municipal government.

Generally,

research in cooptation has assumed that the "average" citizens or
citizen's group is the most likely object of cooptation.

The par-

ticular approach could provide an alternative way of studying the
police controversy in Evanston.

Could the Marywood groups be viewed

as the "coopting" group and city officials as the coopted"?
The present study will focus on the use of cooptation as a
strategy of a city government aimed at controlling groups with interests
contrary to municipal policy and as a response to the challenge of
their support of the police chief despite opposition in the community.
This approach will be utilized in view of the fact that Marywood did
not receive any real, tangible concessions in this controversy.

While

this thesis represents a case study of political opposition at the
local level, it attempts to place the grassroots community movement
behind this controversy in the socio-political context of the 1970's
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and 1980's.

Concern with crime and crime related issues is just one

among many issues which urban social movements have embraced.

Urban

residents are becoming increasingly.active in the local political
arena.
This increased involvement in community affairs can be attributed
to two general societal conditions.

First, the revitalization of urban

neighborhoods and communities has become a pervasive phenomena in
contemporary social life.

Some theorists maintain that in order to

mobilize and maintain the.political participation of citizens, the
issues at hand must have some relevance to their everyday lives
(Flacks, 1976; Boyte, 1980).

Community concern over an escalating

crime rate is such an issue.
A second factor contributing to the resurgence of local political
behavior is related to the political, social and particularly the
economic conditions which are impinging on an increasing porportion
of the American population.

Community protest can be placed within

a Nee-Marxist framework which views the dominant institutions as
propagating the ideology and values of society as a whole.

When

analyzing community protest at the local level, the impact of the
dominant values of the society at large must be taken into consideration.
Local power structures themselves represent "mini versions" of these
dominant institutions.

When situations arise such as the crime con-

troversy in Evanston, community protestors can represent basic threats
to these dominant values.

Community group leaders represent "mediators"

between community residents and city administration.

This study is
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concerned with the link between community leaders and the city
administration and the strategies employed by city administration
to neutralize community opposition and protest through these
community leaders.

CHAPTER III
A CASE STUDY OF INTEREST GROUP POLITICS:

PARTICIPATING ORGANIZATIONS

Evanston is a North Shore suburb of Chicago composed of a population of approximately 73,000 people.

It shares many characteristics

of other suburban areas (largely residential in composition.

Large

sectors of middle and upper class residents, high median incomes,
etc).

Evanston is a stable, attractive city which offers a reputable

community atmosphere for middle income families.

As such, it represents

the comparable life style of such North Shore communities as Wilmette
and Kenilworth at more affordable prices.

Evanston has the particular

attribute of sharing its Southern border with Chicago.

This provides

Evanstonians with all the conveniences of a large city, without the
rapid pace and congestion of Chicago.

Sharing a border with Chicago

also disconcerts some residents because of the fear that Chicago street
gangs and criminals will also take advantage of this easy access.
Evanston also represents a community which has a solid reform
government and a good financial rating in the bond market.

City

administration is carried out largely through the combined efforts of
the city council, the mayor and the city manager.

Evanstonians are

active in civic affairs and frequently make use of alderpersons when
they are in need of community problem resolution.
27

Alderpersons in
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turn are responsive to the needs of residents and make every effort to
solve problems brought to their attention.

Evanston offers residents

the opportunity and satisfaction of participating in community affairs
which shape their everyday lives but at the same time offers the
cosmopolitan attraction of being located near a major city.
During the past decade Evanston has changed with regards to
several basic population characteristics.

The last ten years has

seen a population decrease of approximately 8%.

As would be expected

this decrease in population represents a decline in the overall tax
base.

The tax base provided by the industrial and commercial sectors

has also declined dramatically.

As a result, city officials have

concentrated on making the downtown area of Evanston more attractive
and on urging Evanston merchants to remain in Evanston.
Another population change in the past ten years which deserves
attention is the racial composition of Evanston.

The non-white popula-

tion has increased by 10%, while the white population has decreased by
a full 15%.

The black community has increased by 22% while the Spanish

speaking community has increased by 23%.

These changes represent major

shifts for a relatively stable community and have caused some concern
among residents.

These shifts become even more dramatic if one were

to look closely at the particular areas of the city effected by these
changes.
Inspite of the many positive characteristics which Evanston
possesses, residents have become increasingly self-conscious of their
communities.

This is partially due to the population changes noted
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above.

Since a large sector of Evanston's population is young middle

class families, these families have a vested interest in maintaining
or improving the quality of life in their neighborhoods.

One of the

issues which this increasing concern has centered around is that of
crime and crime related activities.

Evanston has been the site of a

growing problem with burglaries and thefts, as have many urban areas.
While the crime rate has steadily been climbing since the 1960's, in
1979 a dramatic increase occurred in the crime categories of burglary
and theft.

Evanston represents an area which contains a concentration

of families that can afford items which can be easily dispensed with
in the black market.

While other areas such as Wilmette and Kenilworth

have much higher concentrations of wealth, these areas also commonly
invest in elaborate protective devices.
case in Evanston.

This is generally not the

In addition to the increasing rates of reported

crime drawing community attention, the quality and quantity of services
provided by the Evanston Police Department also has become a controversial issue.
In the Fall of 1979 residents in the community surrounding the
Evanston Civic Center became concerned about what they perceived as
the rising rate of crime in their immediate area, as well as the rest
of Evanston.

These residents formed a new community group called the

Marywood Neighbors Association.

The concern this group voiced about

burglary in particular was based on crime reports in the Evanston Review, interaction with neighbors who had actually been victims of
burglary and vicarious information gleaned through third parties.
wood began to voice its concerns at city council meetings.

Mary-

These con-
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cerns were in turn echoed by several alderpersons who claimed to have
been concerned about police service and effectiveness for some time.
In the early part of 1980 the concerns of these residents began to
center around the Evanston Police Department.

They began to question

why there had been such a dramatic increase in burglary (and crime in
general) during the year 1979.

They concluded that the responsibility

for the rising burglary rate rested on the EPD--they simply were not
efficiently and effectively doing their job.

Ultimately the blame came

to rest on Chief William McHugh's shoulders.

The chief was thought to

be incompetent--specifically, it was claimed that he had lost his
effectiveness as a leader after eleven years on the job; he was out of
touch with modern police technology; he had become increasingly removed

.

and inaccessible to the rank and file of the department; had suffered
severe health problems several years previously, and he was seen to
exhibit socially inappropriate behavior in the public arena.
Through the presentation of community demands and concerns voiced
in council meetings and the coverage of these issues by the Suburban
Tribune and the Evanston Review, crime, the effectiveness of the police
department and the competency of the chief became major issues of
debate in the community.
This study will trace the resources available and the courses of
action chosen by the four major organizations involved in this expression of social protest.

These four organizations are the municipal

city government, the city police department, the media, and the
principle community group involved--the Marywood Neighbors Association.
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Following this historical presentation, this study will then concentrate
on the evolution and analysis of the Residential Crime Prevention
Committee (RCPC) and its hypothesized use in a cooptive strategy employed by city administration.
Community Groups
Despite claims of the Evanston Review in its coverage of this
controversy that various community groups were challenging the administrative competency of the chief and the organizational effectiveness
of the police department, only one community group was ever identified
by name as being behind this opposition.
Marywood Neighbors Association.

This group was known as the

The neighborhood which this group

represents is located around the 2100 block of Ridge Avenue in central
Evanston which involves the area surrounding the Civic Center itself.
This area had seen a dramatic increase in crime, particularly burglary.
The concern of this group appears to have at least three sources.
First, there were the actual experiences of persons who had been
burglarized.

The city as a whole had seen a dramtic increase in

burglary and theft during the year of 1979 and the Marywood area was
no exception.
The second source of concern about crime came from persons who
knew other persons who had been victimized.

A third source was

vicarious information gleaned in the form of rumor.

This source of

fear represents a much more difficult source of influence to trace,
but yet has a distinct impact on the perceptions of citizens.
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Marywood had two prominent leaders who
the crime controversy.
Whitemore.

~arne

to the forefront in

These leaders were Daniel Garrison and Daniel

Garrison proved to be the more aggressive and articulate

leader of the group.

It was Garrison who began to frequent city council

meetings and began to raise concern about the escalating crime rate and
subsequently the competency of the chief of police and the organizational effectiveness of the police department as a functional department of the city administration.

Whitemore directed efforts towards

writing editorals and letters for the Evanston Review and attempts to
mobilize larger portions of the Evanston community.
Resources
In analyzing the number and strength of the resources available
to the Marywood community group, several resources can be identified
in their presentation of demands to the city administration.

The first

and probably most common method of citizen involvement in Evanston is
general access to individual alderpersons.

Citizens would contact the

appropriate alderperson when they had an issue or concern which needed
the intervention or attention of the city administration.
widely used technique of involvement.

This is a

As an employee at EPD, the

author frequently received communications from the Assistant City
Manager, Joe Asprooth, which had been referred to him by an alderperson.
It would then be expected that action be taken on these situations by
either investigating or rectifying the situation.

The city manager's

office was conscientious about forwarding such problems to the appropriate departments and requesting feedback for the citizen involved.
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A second resource open to a community group involved direct access
to the city council itself or indirect access to the council through
an alderperson.
office.

This process then would bypass the city manager's

The city manager's office typically did not approve of this

tactic because it left that office in the defensive position of explaining the situation to the council or having to investigate the
situation when first hand knowledge of the complaint was not possessed.
The third resource which a community group has in a "reform" type
of government (Galaskiewicz,_ 1981) is the fact that the city manager,
unlike the mayor of Chicago, has no political "machine" or apparatus to
support him.

In the case of Evanston, the city manager played a very

prominent role investigating and presenting options that the council
might take to solve specific problems.

Since the city manager's job in-

valves full time efforts geared towards the administration of city
resources, a great deal of the responsibility for decisions rests on his
shoulders.
In the case of Evanston, the media represented perhaps the greatest resource open to the community group.

The media often become a

source of legitimation and mobilization of larger public sentiments concerning specific issues (Holotch, 1979).

In this particular case, the

Evanston Review proved to be a valuable resource to the Marywood Neighbars in publicizing their concerns and demands and in creating enough
contoversy that the city administration was forced to respond to their
charges.

The role of the media shall be discussed in a later section.
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Related to the fourth resource available to the community is the
fact that the city manager had previously been criticized for performing his role in an extremely autocratic manager.

The stage was thus

set for an attack on the city manager as utilizing "undemocratic" tactics in administering the resources of "their" city.
Options/Alternatives for Action
Conceptually, ;he resources available to a group of actors
can be separated from the options or alternative courses of action
available to attain organizational goals.

However, in the case of the

Evanston community groups, the alternative courses of action closely
approximate the resources available to the groups and the separation
of these two concepts becomes difficult in practice since the community
group was presenting a criticism of a city administrative department.
Since the city manager/council is legitimately responsible for overseeing the effective functioning of this department, the conmrunity group
can be viewed as a force of opposition to city administration.

Oppo-

sition to what is termed the "ruling elite" greatly reduces the resources
available to the community group mainly because of the city government's
possession of both the coercive and ideological means of social control.
The city administration/police department is also in possession of vital
information which could either refute or substantiate the charges and
demands of the community group.

Only the police department and to some

extent the city manager, has the information which could substantiate
the community claims of escalating crime problems and the organizational
effectiveness of the police department itself.
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In effectively combating the city's own possession of critical
resources, it was necessary for the community group to expand their
own patterns of influence in the community.

This could effectively be

done by mobilizing the sentiments or interests of the larger Evanston
community.

This type of mobilization could be accomplished in two

First, the community group could go out into the community and

ways.

attempt to involve other residents in the controversy.

However, in

terms of cost-effectiveness this tactic could prove impractical since
a large social base was necessary to exert pressure on the city manager/
city council it was unlikely that this strategy alone could mobilize
a substantial portion of the population quickly enough to keep the
issue alive.
A second option which the community

~roup

had open to it was the

use of the media in publicizing their group interests and eliciting
enough support to apply pressure on the city administration.

In the

course of their opposition, the Marywood Neighbors were successful in
pressuring the city council to appropriate $20,000 for a study to be
done within the police department to determine organizational and administrative effectiveness.
Once the community group was successful in having funds appropriated for the Police Management Study, Daniel Garrison was appointed
to the ad hoc committee responsible for drawing the guidelines and
awarding the research grant.

This accomplishment seems unlikely with-

out the legitimization of interest group demands by the Evanston
Review.

In essence, members of Marywood exerted influence on this pro-
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cess in two ways.

First, they applied direct pressure on the city

council, placing the city manager in a defensive position with the
council.

Previous criticisms of Martin's administrative techniques

coupled with the fact that several alderpersons already had concerns
regarding the efficiency and effectiveness of the police department
made the possibility of simply ignoring the charges a politically unwise decision.

Secondly, by making the issue a city wide controversy

in the media, indirect pressure was applied to the city manager.
The Media
The question must now be asked -- how did the concerns and demands
of a relatively small community (interest) group become a matter of
broader public concern?

Or did they?

It is fairly common for specific

interest groups to approach the city council (especially in a suburban
community such as Evanston), with issues they consider salient to the
community.

The question here is why did the interest of the group be-

come so well publicized and how did they come to move the city manager's
office to respond.

To answer this question, discussion will now turn

to the role which the media (specifically the Evanston Review) played
in this process.
The Evanston Review is a weekly community newspaper published by
Pioneer Press, a subsidiary of Time-Life, Inc.

Pioneer Press is based

in Wilmette and publishes community newspapers in a number of north
shore communities.

The Evanston Review is the only local newspaper

published explicitly for Evanston residents.
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In the Fall of 1979, the Evanston Review began to publish articles
"documenting the development of the Marywood Neighbors group and the
concerns which they had begun to articulate".

The author of these

articles was Frank Santos, who was at this time municipal reporter for
1
In article after article, Santos emphasized that 11 Community
the paper.
groups" in Evanston were becoming agitated by the rising crime rate and
were presenting their demands for increased manpower and the removal
of McHugh as chief of police.

Santos always used the plural term groups

when reporting this process, however, not once did he mention the names
of any other community group except Marywood Neighbors.

The pluraliza-

tion of "community groups" served to give legitimacy to the concerns of
the Marywood group.
It is hypothesized that the Evanston Review and Frank Santos as
the reporter/writer of these articles, played a very prominent role in
publicizing Marywood's concerns with crime and the community's perceptions about the extent of the problem and where the focus of responsibility for these problems lies.
In the early part of 1981 Santos received a promotion and transfer
to be editor of the Wilmette paper.

It appears as though his pursuit

and exploitation of the controversy over EPD had "paid off.".

Lt.

MacMillan (Santos inside source at EPD) firmly believed that the city
manager's office had a great deal to do with Santos' transfer to Wil1

Santos was promoted to city editor in June 1980. He was later transferred to the Wilmette Life and named editor in November 1980.
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mette, the purpose being to take the "heat" off the police chief
and subsequently the heat off the city manager as a supporter of the
chief.
The purusal of two years worth of Evanston Review articles on this
issue supports the hypothesis that the crime rate and the competency
of the police chief would not have been issues of great import in the
community without the coverage of the Evanston Review.

A comparison

in the content and number of articles about EPD and McHugh during Santos'
employment at the Evanston Review and in the period since his transfer
indicate a change in reporting style.

If this controversy was as heat-

ed as Santos would portray, why didn't any remaining reporters at the
Evanston Review pick up on this after Santos' transfer?

It seems clear

that in this case, the media had a great deal to do with giving legitimacy to the newly formed Marywood Neighbors Association as the "voice"
of the Evanston community and in making the city council take some investigating action on the matter.

In essence, the Evanston Review

transformed a "mini social movement" into a situation where a citizen's
group was in a position to threaten the city administration.
In investigating the possibility that the Evanston Review played
a prominent role in transforming the concerns of a small percentage of
the population into a city wide controversy, we must ask what the Evanston Review stood to gain from such coverage.

First, since Evanston

is a relatively small community (in the shadow of Chicago), it does not
have many local stories to choose from in creating eye catching headlines.

Since reporters are constantly under pressure to produce
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articles, the "creation" of a community controversy surrounding crime
gave a relatively low key community newspaper sensationalism and a long
running feature story.

It also served to create a "dialogue" between

different members of the community.

Numerous articles/letters in the

"Letters to the Editor" column involved the expression of different
points of view about the police department and the escalating crime
rate.

Two main actors in the Marywood Neighbors Association frequent-

ly had letters published in the column.

On several occasions, letters

commending actions of the Evanston Police Department were also published,
one even accused Marywood of political muckraking.

However, the number

of articles or letters condemning the Evanston Police Department, the
chief and the city manager for the crime problem far outnumbered the
positive letters.
Another consideration in looking at the Evanston Review's role
in the crime issue was the personal interests of the reporter Frank
Santos.

Several persons at EPD voiced the opinion that Santos was

interested in stirring up trouble to further his own career.

Santos

came in on a daily basis to read and take notes on the daily police
bulletin which was produced in the Record Section.

The crimes which

were typed on the bulletin were first selected on a priority basis
by the Record Section--all crimes were not placed on the bulletin.

The

most serious crimes were placed on there with special restrictions
being applied to crimes such as murder, rape and arson.

Santos went

through his own selection process when he published these reports in
the Evanston Review.

He would frequently attempt to get more detailed

information about particular crimes from the Detective Section.
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It was common knowledge at EPD that Lt. Kip MacMillan, who had
just been moved from commander of the detective section to commander of
the youth section, was Santos' "inside source" for the articles he
wrote on the internal problems and dissension at the Evanston Police
Department.

MacMillan himself admitted in an indirect way on one

occasion, that this was the case.

MacMillan hoped to instigate a mild

"internal insurrection" which could feed on the external conflict
generated in the community.

MacMillan proposed the appointment of

Captain William Logan, the only black ranking officer at EPD, as the
new chief with the new position of Deputy Chief created for himself.
As previously pointed out, the black community in Evanston comprises
22% of the total population.

When McHugh was appointed chief in 1969,

the black community had clamored for the appointment of a black police
chief.

MacMillan (and indeed many others in the city) felt that the

time was now ripe for such an appointment to occur.

As a Lieutenant

MacMillan had very little chance of ever being appointed chief through
normal promotional procedures.

Four captains were above him in rank

and he shared the rank of lieutenant with approximately ten other
officers.
MacMillan's ploy for insurgency was unsuccessful for two reasons.
First, he did not have sufficient support within the organization.

In

fact MacMillan was not liked by many officers within the organization
(among the ranking officers as well as the rank and file).

Secondly,

his strategy was unsuccessful because in January of 1981, a black fire
chief had been appointed by the city manager.
the dismissal of a white fire chief.

This appointment followed

The former fire chief had been
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fired because he refused to promote black officers within the fire department.
During this period, Alderman Jack Korshak began to voice strong
opposition to Chief McHugh and EPD in general.

Korshak used this

controversy as a springboard for subsequent challenges of Martin's
authority and decision making.

He later entered in the 1981 mayoral

race against the incumbent mayor. Jay Lytle but was defeated.

Korshak

made the crime rate, the police chief and the EPD crucial issues in his
mayoral campaign.

This served to keep the controversy going for an

additional period of time.

Korshak's campaign also presented a possible

threat to Martin's position for Korshak posed the threat of being
a strong adversary of Martin's.

If Korshak were elected mayor, Martin's

authoritarian control would loosen and if Korshak were successful in
gaining council support, Martin could conceivably be ousted from his
job.

Martin therefore had a vested interest in placating the concerns

being voice about the EPD.

Martin responded to this situation in a

variety of ways. This will be discussed in detail in the subsection
entitled "Municipal City Government".
Municipal Police Department
In discussing the Evanston Police Department, two levels of
analysis will be utilized.

These levels will be the organization, as

a whole and the discussion of individual members as they pertain or
play a role in the community controversy at hand.

This section will

focus on the role of the police department as an organization in this
controversy.

The role of individual members will be discussed later.
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The EPD has a history of providing outstanding service to the
community.

This history is presented on one entire wall of the lobby

where commendations and achievement awards from various nationally
recognized law enforcement agencies are displayed.

The EPD has been

a department of national acclaim for both its service and level of
technology during the 1960's.

It was the contention of some members of

the community, the media and members of EPD itself, that both the
quality of the serivce provided and organizational effectiveness had
greatl~r

declined in the twenty year interim.

As the police controversy

gained in intensity, the organizational problems attributed to EPD were
more clearly stated.
A content analysis of a two year span of Evanston Review newspaper articles yielded three types of issues involved in this instance
of social protest.

These are community related issues, issues pertain-

ing to the competency of the chief and organizational problems of the
police department itself.

Responses from the city administration will

also be analyzed on these same three levels.

Community related issues

consisted of a general community concern over the escalating crime rate,
increasing incidents of burglary and of the general perception that
neither the police chief or city administration were inherently interested in the problems or issues of the community at large.
The second general category of issues involved questions as to the
actual competency of the administrative staff of EPD, specifically the
chief of police,

The following list summarizes the general attributes

at question here:

Does the chief have an acceptable level of "expert
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knowledge" in terms of record keeping, crime prevention and apprehension
technologies?

Is the chief an effective leader in both the police

department and the community

~s

a whole?

Does the chief have the

ability and capacity to make effective decisions with regards to the
organization of the department, the setting of departmental policy and
the implementation of these procedures?

Does the chief exhibit behavior

which would be considered socially inappropriate for a city official
in public places--specifically in the form of public drunkeness or
public outbursts of .anger?

Lastly, is the chief physically capable of
2

holding the office of police .chief?
The third type of criticism leveled at the EPD surrounded specific
organizational problems.

This category was comprised of the problems

considered most crucial by community leaders, the media, and members of
EPD itself.

This category of criticism can be further delineated into

three main types.

These types may be described as organizational pro-

blems involving the chief's interaction with the rank and file and other
members of the organization, problems involving the appropriation of
adequate resources (manpower and material) and the chief's perceived
lack of independence from the city manager.
With regard to the interactions between the chief and other organizational members the following points were raised:

the chief

failed to communicate effectively with the rank and file, hold the

2

The chief had suffered a massive stroke from which he had not been
expected to recover and had undergone heart surgery to repair a
blockage following this.
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rank and file accountable for departmental procedures, allow appropriate rank and file input into the decision making of his administration,
the increasing separation of the administrative staff from the "cop"
on the street and the existence of a select group of personal ufavorites" on the part of the chief.

Criticisms surrounding the acqui-

sition and allocation of resources were aimed more at the level of city
administration rather than aimed specifically at the chief of police.
This category of criticism was based on the perception that the police
department did not possess adequate manpower, financial and technological resources. Having briefly outlined the community, administrative, and organizational problems which were attributed to the police
department, in the following section the resources available to the
police department in reaction to these charges will be discussed.
Organizational Resources in Combating Controversy
In analyzing the resources available to the police department
the discussion shall center around the resources available to the
chief of police as the administrator of the police department.

The

primary resource available to the chief was his direct access to the
city manager.

The chief, as a departmental head was in a position to

interact and communicate on a regular basis with the city manager.

In-

ternally, the chief was believed to do just what the city manager told
him to do--a situation not considered proper by many sworn personnel
believing that civilians were not in a position to understand nor make
decisions on police matters.

The chief was regarded as a rather "power-

less" department head by both insiders and outsiders.

This was mainly
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in terms of his interaction with the city manager and other department
heads in the vying for distribution of city resources.
Direct access to the city manager provided the chief with a means
for presenting his point of view and influencing the course of action
taken by the city manager.

This also meant that the chief was in a

position to present as much or as little relevant information to the
city manager as he considered proper in arguing his case.

It was well

known at EPD that the chief did not want the city manager to know about
the organizational problems plaguing the department.

The chief fre-

quently withheld information that could be damaging either to the department or to his ability to run it.
A second resource available to the chief was his control over the
formal organizational contacts of the department with the media and
the public at large.

He could and did limit the crime statistical

information released to both the public and the media.

Contributing

to this limitation, however, was the fact that the Record Section
could not effectively and efficiently produce the type of information
frequently requested.

This formal control of public contacts with

departmental personnel made many organizational members apprehensive
in voicing any opinions or in releasing any information concerning departmental procedures.
The main aspect of this resource which the chief failed to exploit was the role of the community in reducing both the fear of crime
and in preventing crime.

Access to the community was an avenue that he

chose not to deal with in responding to the controversy.

He might
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have been in a better position to counteract the media and community
group efforts to replace him, had he used the same strategy that the
community had in mobilizing public opinion.
The third resource available to the chief is closely tied to the
above mentioned resource.

The chief had formal control over the dis-

semination of departmental information.
procedures, goals, and future plans.

This included crime statistics,

The chief chose the strategy of

cutting off all information emanating from the department to the public
or the media.

He chose instead to present a hostile attitude towards

reporters from the Evanston Review and community groups when they requested specific crime information about their areas.

He regarded these

requests as personal afronts to his integrity and the department's.

If

the chief had been more willing to cooperate with concerned citizens
and enlist their help in combating the crime problem and the fear of
crime, much of the fervor of the controversy might have been drained off.
A fourth resource which became available to the chief in the early
stages of the controversy was the inception of "expert knowledge
form of a new Director of Planning and Research.

in the

While this Director

did have considerable influence on the chief, he would have been used
more effectively as a buffer between the chief and the community.

Since

the Director had considerable experience in research concerning community
participation, the phenonmena of fear of crime, and the crime analysis,
his skills could have been better utilized in the direction of community
relations.
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Options/Alternative Courses of Action
Having been placed in the center of a political controversy,
the chief had two main alternatives open to him.

First, he could make

an effort to involve the community in solving organizational and community related police problems.

Secondly, he could choose to deny the

existence of these problems and deal with the community groups as an
adversary.

He chose the second alternative in dealing with the con-

troversy.
The chief was openly hostile to community groups requesting information from his office and adopted a defensive posture when the press
attempted to gather information for its feature stories.

Having chosen

to view the community groups openly as adversaries, he precluded the
possibility of neutralizing the criticisms of the police department by
working with the community to alleviate its concerns and fears.
Municipal City Government
In discussing the role the city government played in the crime/
police department controversy, analysis shall be restricted to the office
of the city manager and how his responses served to neutralize the protest of the community.

The municipal government in Evanston represents

what is termed a "reform'' government (Galaskiewicz, 1981).

As opposed

to a city like Chicago where governmental affairs are controlled by a
federation of politicians elected by neighborhood constituencies ( or
more precisely the democratic machine), Evanston's affairs are administered by a small core of experts.

The office of mayor is an elected
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office but possesses very little real power.
official spokesperson for the city.

This office serves as the

It is not clear whether this lack

of mayoral influence is due to the constitution of the reform govern- ·
ment or the result of the dominant influence of the City Manager, Edward
Martin.
fluences.

It could be speculated that it is a combination of both inGalaskiewcz (1981) maintains that "because reform politicians

do not have a political organization to shield them they are more vulnerable to outside influence" (Galaskiewcz, 1981: 265).

In the same

vein other writers (Bonfield and Wilson, 1963; Smith, 1979; Lowi, 1964;
Dye and Garcia, 1978), contend that these reform governments secure the
support of their constituencies by exchanging public goods and services
for acquiescence, synthesizing these compromises in terms of dominant
societal values.

It is from this point of view that discussions of the

city manager's responses will be approached.
Among city employees Martin has a reputation for being a competent authoritarian manager.

At the time the controversy began he had

been manager for nine and one half years, and had been credited with
balancing the city's fiscal budget.
Martin typically was able to sway the city council his way on
issues that required their approval.

When the charges against Chief

McHugh were made public, Martin issued a strong statement in support
of the chief, however, the council was not willing to accept Martin's
assurances without some investigation of the EPD.

The resources

available to the city will now be discussed with a detailed discussion
of responses following.
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Resources
Martin's greatest resource in dealing with the criticisms of Marywood was his direct access to the city council.

Even in light of the

concern expressed by some council members, Martin was still in a position to present evidence and information to influence the decisions
and sympathies of council members.

In a reform government such as that

exemplified in Evanston, the city manager's position is a full time professional job requiring specific skills.

City council members and the

mayor are part time employees of the city who spread their energies between full time employment elsewhere and their community concerns as
alderpersons.

Martin devotes all of his energy and time to the business

of administering the city resources.

It therefore can be concluded that

he is in a better position to present information which would support
his recommendations to the council.

He also is more likely to antici-

pate the broader implications of actions taken by the council for the
city as a whole.
A second resource of Martin's was his authority to fire or force
a resignation from the police chief.

This was not a resource he chose

to excercise but it was an alternative available.

Closely related to

this resource is Martin's ability to formally and informally effect
the chief's decisions in administering the police department and in reacting to the controversy surrounding him.

During this time period it

was very apparent that the chief made few moves without the explicit
approval or sanction of the city manager.

It can be hypothesized

that the city manager had a great deal to do with the chief's choice
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of strategies in dealing with the charges lodged against him.

This

strong influence which Martin had over the chief's decisions effectively gave him control over the police department itself.
A third resource available to the city manager pertains to the
access of information relative to the organizational problems and the
crime information at the police department.

The city manager had the

advantage of being able to peruse city information which the community
groups did not have access to.
respond to charges.

This put him in a better position to

In Pfeffer's (1978) terms, Martin effectively

reduced the uncertainty factor for the city administration, while increasing the uncertainty factor expressed by the community groups.
In addition to having access to more information, Martin also had
the added resource of having control over how that information was disseminated to other city employees, the city council, and the public.
Control of this information could be crucial in building a case which
refutes the charges made by the community group.

Martin could effect-

ively "pick and choose" information which would be released to direct
attention away from legitimate problems which could be a source of
embarrassment for him and his administration.

The authority of the city manager as administrator for the city
also placed formal means of social control at his disposal.

Coercive

tactics could have been employed with such things as disruptive instances occuring at council meetings, etc.
a 1 so had access to funds to be used to

II

As city manager, Martin

stifle II

•

soc~al

protest.

51

Options/Alternative Courses of Action
The reader will recall, this controversy grew out of the Marywood
Neighbors Association's concern about the escalating crime rate in Evanston and the media coverage of these concerns and the actions of this
group in presenting these issues to the city council.

As the strength

of these concerns became intensified by the media, the city manager was
the object of pressure from various sources.

First, he was under pres-

sure from the community at large to make some response and take some
action to investigate _charges that had been made against the police department.

Secondly, he was being pressured by the city council to pro-

vide evidence that the charges made against the police department were
not true and that measures were being taken to rectify any problems
found in this investigation.

Thirdly, with the mayoral elections coming

up in the Spring of 1981, Martin had a vested interest in assuring both
the community and the city council that such organizational and administrative problems did not exist in the police department.
Discussion will now proceed to a delineation of the three directions which Martin's responses to the police controversy took.
directions are depicted in Figure 1.

These

These responses correspond to thP

three types of issues which the community and the media addressed as being characteristic of EPD.
First of all the city manager had the option of supporting or
opposing the chief of police under the attack of the community and
media.

Martin openly supported the chief in reaction to the charges
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made by the media, community groups and the personnel in the police
department itself.

In the initial furor of these charges, Martin

stated that "I've no thoughts of asking the chief to resign.

As far

as I'm concerned, he is doing the job" (Evanston Review, February 7,

1980: 14).

Throughout the whole debate about the police department

which ensued over the next year and brought the subsequent retirement
of McHugh, Martin never relinquished his initial support of the chief.
In April of 1980 a series of articles (three) appeared in the
Suburban Tribune which posed serious charges against the Evanston
Police Department, its management by Chief McHugh and the ultimate
responsibility of Martin as city manager (and the powerful decision
maker believed to be behind many of McHugh's moves as chief).

These

charges included many of those prev1ously mentioned in the discussion
of the police department earlier in this chapter.

Among these were

charges of low morale among the rank and file which was proported to
be the basis of another charge against the effectiveness and efficiency
of the patrol section.

Other charges were geared towards the absence

of investigative procedures for the large volume of burglary cases and
the lack of adequate departmental resources.
Following the Suburban Tribune series, the city manager and the
chief declined comment on the issues raised and stated that they would
carry out separate investigations to determine if there was any truth
to the allegations.

However, both community groups and members of the

city council requested that the Police Management Study include an investigation of the charges made in these articles.

Martin called a
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special meeting of the city council to discuss the series and promised
to submit a report in response to the charges and stated that he expected the management audit to pursue those charges also.
Public Responses
Responses from the city council were varied.

Some council mem-

bers felt the problems at EPD to be symptomatic of the city management
(Martin) rather than the sole blame of the chief.
stated that she "was glad to see it written.

One alderperson

I have long felt that the

Evanston Police Department needed some looking into.

Ed (Martin) always

has been very defensive of the police department as though it were his
private domain" (Suburban Tribune, April 28, 1980).

Others were not

confident the Tribune series had reliable sources but also felt that
some attention should be paid to the matter.

Members of the Marywood

Association had strong reactions to these articles.

Garrison stated

that the series "provided a very clear background against which any
(management study) investigator is going to have to work (Suburban
Tribune, April 28, 1980).

Whitmore, also a member of the same group,

stated that he was "disappointed, very depressed" by the series and
that he "didn't realize that the problems were that severe.

It's

just like we're helpless" (Suburban Tribune, April 28, 1980).
On May 5, 1980, Ed Martin issued his response to the series of
articles in the Suburban Tribune concerning the police department.
Martin's response grouped the issues raised by the series into five
main categories.

These consisted of:

Police activity, manpower issues,
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the adequacy and behavior of the support systems, equipment questions,
and morale.
Internal Responses
A second response initiated by Martin pertained to the internal
dynamics of EPD.

Both the Suburban Tribune and Santos had expounded

on the internal problems of EPD based on information from an unnamed
"inside source".

Numerous reports appeared in the Suburban Tribune

and Evanston Review citing dissension between ranking officers, the
rank and file and the chief.

The chief was accused of being authori-

tarian in his method of administration and being so far removed from
the rank and file that he had no awareness of the problems faced by
officers on the street nor did they have any input into policy making.
The chief was directly accused of running the department staff meetings
in a purely autocratic manner leaving no room for comment or questioning.

It had been remarked to the author on several occasions that

supervisors had learned a lesson when asking questions or making
comments during these meetings.

Officers had been the object of ex-

tremely angry verbal attacks until it got to the point that there was
no input from supervisors during these meetings at all.
Following the publication of these newspaper articles, the
city manager held a special staff meeting with the chief and his ranking staff where internal problems were to be brought to light.
events took place prior to the author's employment at EPD.

These

From the

time the author started attending these meetings, the tone was different than what had been described as taking place in earlier meetings.
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Interviews with officers who attended this meeting indicated that Ed
Martin was concerned with the charges lodged in these newspaper articles
and believed that these problems could be "worked" out.

It was ob-

vious that Martin took the internal complaints about EPD and the chief
serious enough to make an overt attempt at a solution.
Also during this time period, plans to "reorganize" the police
department were made public.

The Detective Section had been the

brunt of much criticism in the handling of burglary cases.

The

commander of this section was moved to the Youth Section (Lt •. MacMillan--Santos' "secret" source) and a captain was moved up from patrol
to head the Investigative Section.

This was the major change among a

series of minor changes instituted by the chief.
Martin had originally proposed allocating additional funds to
expand the police force in the fiscal year to begin in March 1980.
However, constraints placed on the municipal budget in the form of a
decreasing tax base (both a decrease in local businesses and population) and spiraling demands for public services forced him to withdraw this budgetary proposal.

It is spoken here as though Martin has

exclusive and final authority over the city budget.

Formally, the

budget is subject to the formal consent of the mayor and aldermanic
vote, however, Martin was thorough in many proposals put before the
council and was usually quite successful in getting what he wanted
from the council.

A portion of the money originally to be allocated

for increased manpower ($20,000) was set aside for the Police Management Study requested by Marywood.
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The final budget included a plan to "civilianize" several
supervisory positions held by ranking police personnel.

The division

between sworn personnel and civilian personnel at EPD (and from the
literature this is true in other police departments and military
organizations) is a schism of great magnitude--sworn personnel consist of all police personnel who have taken the oath to serve and protect the public and who are vested with the power to arrest.
staff consisted basically of clerical positions prior to 1980.

Civilian
They

were not organized in a military ranking system although they were
bound by the General Orders put forth by the chief and were expected
to abide by the "chain of connnand" in formal departmental matters.
At the time of the departmental controversy, three positions
were scheduled to become civilian posts.

These positions were 1)

the Director of Planning and Research 2) the Property Officer and
3) the Supervisor of Records.
process.

Three main objectives were met by this

First, it "freed" three ranking officers from desk jobs

to return to street duty--the city manager's office and the chief
then maintained that this in fact represented an "increase" in manpower.

It also brought "new blood" to EPD in the form of new civilians

Lastly, it would eventually result in a salary savings because these
sworn positions would be eliminated eventually by attrition.
The above actions represent Martin's efforts to alleviate the
"internal" pressures within the police department.

Martin faced a

double challenge with the police controversy because he had to deal
with internal conflict as well as the external conflicts within the
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the community.

It is obvious from the number of strategies which

were geared towards involvement or placating of the community, that
Martin considered the external sources of conflict the greater threat
to the stability of his administration.
The Police Management Study
Both Marywood's demand for an independent study of EPD and the
doubts being voiced in the council chambers led to the appropriation
of $20,000 for a management study of the police department.

Marywood

had originally demanded that the chief be demoted and assigned to a
less stressful position at EPD.

The management study was Martin's

way of acknowledging the charges made against the chief without taking
direct action.

On February 23, 1980 the Police Services Committee

named an ad hoc committee to formulate specific guidelines for both
the content and selection of a research group to conduct the audit.
The proponents of the management study encountered delays in the
award of the study because of objections raised by Alderman Korshak.
Korshak felt that the guidelines proposed by the ad hoc committee
would not resolve the serious management problems which he believed
to exist in the department.

Korshak maintained that there was "per-

vasive evidence of a lack of discipline" and that "the command of
Evanston is inadequate".

Korshak called for "a good street wise cop"

to investigate the Evanston Police.

He maintained that in order to

restore confidence in the EPD by the citizenry, the city council must
be ready to take a more searching review of the command of the depart-
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ment.

Korshak was successful in delaying the study for two months

pending his submission of an alternative proposal.

Korshak's proposal

placed a stronger emphasis on studying the top command of the department.

Upon rejection of his proposal, Korshak was urged to join a

subcommittee assigned to review bid submissions.

The reader will re-

call that Korshak became a serious opponent of the incumbent mayoral
candidate in the 1981 city elections, however, he was not successful
in his candicacy.
One June 26, 1980 an RFP for the management study was submitted
by Alderperson Sherry Laycock, Chair of the Police Services Committee.
The research grant was awarded to Research Management Associates, Inc.,
an independent research firm from Herndan, Virginia.
released in August 1981.

The report was

The two person research team used a comb-

ination of several techniques for assessing the overall effectiveness and efficiency of EPD.

The report was a surprisingly low key

analysis (or perhaps not so surprisingly).

The report was suppose to

be an assessment of the administration of top ranking personnel (most
particularly the chief) and was also suppose to make recommendations
for improvement.

While this statement on the report will be relative-

ly general in nature, it should be pointed out that very little of
the detailed information gathered throughout the project was included
in the final report.

Even more interesting is the fact that the re-

port had only positive things to say about McHugh when it was public
knowledge within EPD that there was open hostility and disagreement
between the research team and the chief of police.

It is speculated
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at this time, that the concept of the management study was viewed by
the city manager as a means to placate community dissension while the
chief instituted plans to retire at his 29th year service anniversary
date (most probably a plan suggested and instituted by Martin to save
face for both himself and the chief and let time and the furor pass
so that it would not appear as though the chief was retiring under
pressure but under his own volition.)
Chief McHugh announced his retirement in May 1981 (to become
effective September 30, 1981).

This was mentioned in the management

report along with a statement about the fact that McHugh's tenure as
chief in Evanston was approximately three times the average tenure of
police chiefs across the nation and that while he had done an admirable
job, "new blood" was always a good thing for an organization.
We can then identify this response (the management study) as a
cooptive tactic employed by the city manager.

For all appearances, a

thorough organization analysis was being conducted of EPD along with
an assessment of the management competency of the chief as requested
by Marywood and the city council, with Martin in total control of the
outcome or more specifically with the release of this information.
The leaders of Marywood Neighbors had been "absorbed" into a steering
committee in terms of producing the research proposal and their demands
for the demotion or removal of the chief had effectively been neutralized.
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The Comprehensive Crime Prevention Program
In the early part of 1980 EPD had applied for a three year grant
from the Illinois Law Enforcement Commission (ILEC) which was entitled
the

Comprehensive Community Crime Prevention Program.

The program

was funded for one year with subsequent funding contingent upon the
submission of a summary report at the end of the first year.
grant was composed of several parts.

This

First, one portion of research

was geared towards an understanding and assessment of community groups
in Evanston and the issues for which these groups had the greatest
concern.
Another section of the grant was devoted to the commercial sector
and its crime problems.

Westinghouse Evaluation Institute conducted

a survey of Evanston merchants to determine both the rate of victimization (apart from the reported crime rate), the major concerns of
businesses and what they would like to see done in conjunction with
the police department to reduce or prevent crime in the future.
There is currently a commercial

~rime

prevention program operating

separately from the residential crime program which is the focus of
this study.
The third major subdivision of the grant pertains to education in
the schools.

Efforts are being made to incorporate this program into

the curriculum to educate

children as to the effects and responsib-

ilities of such criminal activities as vandalism, theft, and even
curfew violation.

This aspect of the program is also conducting a

survey of juvenile delinquency where juveniles are asked (anonymously)
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whether they had ever participated in such activities as smoking
marijuana, stealing, graffti, vandalism, etc.

While this program

constitutes a major area of research, it too is not the subject of the
present field work.

This aspect of the project was co-directed by

the Director of Planning and Research and Officer Kaminski of the
Planning and Training Section.
The Comprehensive Community Crime Prevention 5rant combines four
separate research projects with three corresponding community based
groups.

Two of the four research projects were subcontracted out to

independent research teams.

The first project involved two surveys.

One survey consisted of a random digit dialing of Evanston residents
to determine the major issues of concern among city residents.

The

second aspect of this project involved the composition of a comprehensive list of community organizations and the selection of a representative sample for a survey on issues and objectives of these groups.
The purpose of this two fold project was to determine the salient
issues and concerns of Evanston residents in general and of community
organizations in particular.

One clear objective of the study was

to ascertain just how pervasive the fear of crime was in Evanston.
The second research project involved a survey of commercial
businesses designed to measure the pervasiveness of crime concerns in
the commercial sector and the extent to which these commercial establishments were victimized by crime.
A third research project was designed and implemented by the
author in the record section.

Burglary rates had risen dramatically
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in 1970 and appeared to be increasing in 1980.

Since burglary was a

major issue of the police department controversy, the Director of
Planning and Research (Rosenbaum) and the author, decided to focus
this part of the grant on investigating three aspects of the burglary
problem in Evanston--the environment/social characteristics, the
victim and the offender.

Data were coded from the original police

reports for one half of all residential burglaries and a total sample
of commercial and other miscellaneously classified burglaries for the
year 1980.

The entire sample consisted of approximately 1400 cases.

The results are expected to be released in May 1982.

These results

are to be made available to the Residential Crime Prevention Committee and are expected to have some input on the future direction of
this committee's crime prevention program.
A fourth research project is to be carried out in the summer of
1982.

Data for this study are to be gleaned from an experimental

dissemination of a community crime prevention newsletter.

Newsletters

containing community news, crime prevention tips and crime information
are not new to crime prevention programs.

This study seeks to empir-

ically measure the impact of a crime prevention letter on the behaviors
of individual citizens exposed to specific crime information in their
area (actual crime rates) and its possible indirect effects in reducing
crime and increasing apprehension.
This project ·is the prime responsibility of Rosenbaum (Director of
Planning and Research and also a psychologist), and Lavrakas.

While

this project was initiated by the Residential Crime Prevention Commit-
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tee as a whole, interviews with members of this committee and the
author's observations revealed that this newsletter was not a high
priority in their own goals for the committee and that Rosenbaum had
succeeded in "pushing" che newsletter through the committee as the
first project to be tackled.
The three organizations to come out of the crime prevention grant
pertain to three sectors of influence--a commercial crime prevention
committee, a residential crime preventional committee and an educational
program instituted in the schools.

The Residential Crime Prevention

Committee is the prime focus of this paper because it represents a
juncture of cooperation by the police department, city administration
and concerned citizens groups.

CHAPTER IV
RESULTS
Cooptation as a Survival Mechanism of Local Power Structure
The original inclusion of the Residential Crime Prevention
Committee in the grant application was a process independent of the
media debate regarding the police chief and the police department.
The grant was written six months to a year prior to the formation of
the Marywood Neighbors Association and their subsequent activities
with the city council.

In contrast to Selznick's study of the coop-

tive process, it cannot therefore be stated that the conception of the
crime prevention committee was a strategy employed to neutralize ££tential forces of resistence in the community.

The committee was de-

signed to facilitate better community relations with police and to
increase feelings of personal safety in the community at large.

How-

ever, as the police controversy became full blown and the management
capabilities of the police chief and ultimately the city manager came
into question, the formation of this committee was cited as evidence
of city efforts to deal with the crime issue.
In his response made to the city council concerning the allegations made in the Suburban Tribune articles, Martin stated that:
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As I re-read the articles, I was concerned and obviously angered
at some of the innuendo and points raised and the overall impression given by the articles that Evanston is an antiquated, unprofessional Police Department with men who don't care and wit~ no
directions or tools to use. I do think it important to spend some
time reminding the City Council and others of the leadership efforts
our Department has been involved in ••••• In the very current climate
you have the first major arrest of a terrorist group in the nation,
the development of the Bicycle Enforcement Program Grant; the Crime
Prevention Grant Program which is pending now before I.L.E.C.; the
naming, just recently, of two Evanston Police Officers by the Combined Counties Police Association as the "Officers of the Year,"
an award given by their peers throughout the entire organization;
and the continuation of our existing programs; the recent civilianization effort, which we all believe will make the operation more
effective, as well as the utilization of Park Pat~ol Officers and
the like. (City Memorandum, May 5, 1980).
·
In his 1980 statement of departmental objectives, McHugh stated
that the "Endorsement of a grant application to the Illinois Law Enforcement Commision" was one of the five parts of his program to
strengthen the police department for the fiscal year 1981 (Evanston
Review, February 7, 1980).
In his presentation of the guidelines for the Police Management
Study, Assistant City Manager, Joel Asprooth, again cited the
Comprehensive Community Crime Prevention Program (CCCPP) as a part of
the city's efforts at strengthening the police department.

Accusa-

tions were made at the meeting by members of Marywood, that these
guidelines were "vague" and "lacking specifics to determine the actual
extent of criminal activity including victimization and the study of
the public safety by other city departments 11 (Evanston Review, June 5,
1980: 6).

Asprooth responded to these reservations by pointing out

that CCCPP would contain many of the answers to Marywood's questions.
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Upon the actual awarding of the CCCPP, McHugh again stressed the
fact to the Evanston Review, that the "focus of this program is to
develop a stable partnership between the police department and many
public and private organizations."

Specifically, the programs expected

to:
•
•
•
•
•

Develop and implement crime prevention strategies.
Reduce crime and juvenile delinquency.
Improve crime prevention skills of criminal justice personnel.
Develop community awareness and involvement in combatting crime
and neighborhood security.
Develop educational strategies (Evanston Review, August 24,
1980: 16).

The CCCPP was also cited by the Director of Planning and Research
as a crucial component of the development of good police-community relations and in making Evanston "an example to other cities throughout
the country that are facing the same crime problems" (Evanston Review, April 30, 1981: 20A)
As the above citations indicate, the actual conceptualization
of the Residential Crime Prevention Committee (RCPC) was not ·initiated
as a response to the demands of citizen concerns.

Rather, it was en-

visioned as part of a comprehensive effort to plan a workable program
by developing "a stable partnership between the police department and
other public and private groups to reduce crime and the fear of crime
in Evanston" (Evanston Review, July 24, 1980: 20A).

It can therefore

be concluded that the original intent of this program was not the
cooptation or absorption of leaders of the community as a means of
neutralizing social protest.

However, as the community dialogue con-

cerning the police department, the police chief and crime intensified,
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the development of the RCPC became an increasingly important adjunct
of the city administration's efforts to appease citizen protest.
Rosenbaum (the Director of Planning and Research) had been
3

involved in the grant application submitted in the early part of 1980.
Prior to the first closed meeting of the RCPC, Rosenbaum was asked by
this author, whether city hall or the city manager had been involved
in these meetings in any way.

He stated that the city manager's office

had "expressed an interest in what would take place at these meetings
and what their objectives would be".

When asked whose idea the or-

ganization of these meetings was, he stated that it was his own and that
it had been written into the crime prevention grant two years previously.
The degree of importance which all involved organizations attributed to the RCPC, has fluctuated in intensity at several points
along the continuum of its conceptualization, evolution, and organization.

The original inclusion of the committee in the grant application

was based on crime prevention programs developed in other municipalities
as evidence by much of the crime prevention literature.

At this

point it was merely a neutral abstraction from both an academically
and practically designed prevention program.

However, as both the

city administration and the police department felt compelled to "react"
3

This prior to his second employment at EPD. It was apparent at this
point that Rosenbaum had a vested interest in the development and implementation of these results as he was then an employee o:!: ~-:resting
house Evaluation Institute, which was to be the recipient of one of
the subcontracts of the research proposal.
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to the concerns and demands of community residents, the idea of a community police based crime prevention committee took on new importance.
As previously mentioned, the formation of this committee was offered
by various city officials as a positive action geared towards the resolution of citizens' concerns.

These events all took place prior to

the announcement of McHugh's retirement in May of 1981.
Following the chief's announcement that he would retire in
September 1981, the administrators of the police department in particular and the· city in general became less interested in the particular functions of this committee.

By the time the RCPC held its

first closed door meeting in September o£ 1981, neither the chief nor
the city manager were interested in this committee for the same reasons
for which they had previously shown an interest.

The political pres-

sure for the chief's resignation or replacement had disappeared because
the chief had voluntarily forfeited his role by the fact of his retirement.

As previously discussed, this action was timed so as not to

appear as an admission of "guilt" nor as a response to community pressure.

Also at this time, the Police Management Study was in full

swing and thus another of the community demands had been realized (however superficial).

At this point in time the RCPC might be regarded

as a "back up" political strategy which had not been fully exploited
but nevertheless remained should the need to use it arise.
The relative lack of attention which characterized both the city
and the police administration's attitude towards the RCPC can be
demonstrated in two ways.

First, the chief had less than two months
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before his retirement from the department.

The political conflict

surrounding both his competency and the efficiency and effectiveness
of the police department had slowly been appeased by the variety of
methods discussed earlier.

Once the chief announced his impending

retirement, the protesting group no longer had the resource of public
indignation on their side.

Arousing public sentiments empowered them

when the demand for McHugh's resignation or termination was a possibility.

Having chosen retirement, McHugh no longer had a vested interest

in cultivating community opinion.

Therefore when the RCPC was in its

formative stages, the police chief took no active interest or part in
the process. He literally stood to gain nothing from the involvement.
The Resource Committee's inability to get formal statement of support
from police administration when questioned by the RCPC, made this situation very apparent.
Early in the development of the committee, several members had
questioned the amount and kind of official support their activities
and programs would glean from the police department.

The Resource

Committee was vague in responding to these questions, often making
statements such as "this has yet to be determined by the new police
chief when the selection process has been completed."

The Resource

Committee actually commented on one occasion that they had to be very
careful in their representation of the police department because they
did not have the authority to officially commit the police department
nor the City of Evanston to the continuation of the crime prevention
program beyond the period covered by the grant.

Resource Committee
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members were obviously uncomfortable when these citizen concerns were
voiced.

Their main concern at this time was not with the eminent

future of the RCPC but with the immediate implementation of goals
which they had written into the crime prevention grant.
Once the uncertainty of official support from police administration became apparent to the committee, attention turned to questioning the official recognition and support from the city manager's
office.

The Resource Committee was questioned as to whether the city

manager and the city council were aware of their existence, their
activities, and whether the city would support their programs both
officially and financially following the expiration of the federal
grant.

Again, answers were vague indicating the uncertainty under

which the police department was operating at the time.

Resource

Committee members did not have the authority to commit either the police department nor the

~ity

to the future of the RCPC.

However, they

were very much aware of the political ramifications of this uncertainty.

Their own political power (and indeed the security of their jobs)

was contingent upon remaining vaguely noncommital until a new police
chief was selected and subsequently announced his own stand on crime
prevention and police/community

relations.

The Resource Committee was also very much aware of the RCPC's
need for assurance that their efforts were to be takan seriously and
that they would ultimately have some impact in the community at large.
On several occasions Rosenbaum brought up the organizational problem
of keeping community leaders interested and involved in a committee.
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He stressed several times the importance of developing multiple issues
which would help to ensure the continuation of the committee above
and beyond the life of the crime prevention grant.
Rosenbaum is familiar with research regarding the mobilization of
citizens in to community activities.

Since the attendance of some

committee members had been rather sporadic, this was a concern to
the Resource Committee.

This is typically not a characteristic of

a group which poses a threat to the city/police administration.

This

would preclude the process of cooptation from two perspectives.

First,

since there is the need to motivate community involvement, the RCPC
does not represent an organization which the Resource Committee needs
to coopt.

Secondly, the Resource Committee's interest in alleviating

this organizational problem is indicative of a genuine concern for the
success of the committee which goes beyond the immediate concern
for implementing the feasibility tests.

Although operating at a

disadvantage because of the high degree of uncertainty involved in the
continuation and official direction of the committee, the resource
committee itself has excercised a high degree of control over the goal
setting of the organization and the implementation of the programs
which it has developed.

We shall discuss this control in greater

detail in a later section.
A third variation in the degree of importance attributed to the
RCPC occurred in December 1981.

The city manager, after twelve years

as the chief city administrator, announced his resignation from his
post to take the same position in Corpus cristi, Texas.

This city
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administrator now no longer had a vested interest in perpetuating and
legitimizing the RCPC.

This evaluation in no way intends to completely

discount the possibility that either the city administration or the
city council had a sincere interest in the community welfare being
addressed by this committee.

The intention is merely to point out

that this issue was no longer politically volatile because the direction
of public sentiment no longer served as a powerful resource because
two of the principle actors in the controversy had exited the city.
The importance of the RCPC recently took on a new dimension of
importance.

Howard L. Rogers assumed the position of Chief of Police

on January 4, 1982.

Rogers is the former assistant Chief of Police of

Cinncinnati, Ohio.

Organizationally Rogers suffers a disadvantage not

previously encountered by McHugh.

McHugh had the advantage of sharing

an organizational history with the officers and the rank and file
under his command.

While as previously discussed this shared history

can cause problems of "cronyism" and organization inefficiency, it
does offer the chief a social base on which to build his administration
and authority.

Rogers as an outsider, does not have this history to

form a social basis of support within the organization.
Rogers has attempted to establish himself with the police department in two ways.

First~

Rogers has extensively interviewed and dis-

cussed departmental procedures and needs with top ranking personnel
as well as the rank and file.

He has reinstituted the importance

given to rank and organizational experience as prerequisites for
division heads and section heads.

This hierarchy had become less
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important during the year prior to McHugh's retirement.

Following

the transformation of several top ranking positions to civilian positions, there had been an accompanying increase in the chief's reliance
on civilian "expertise".

Rosenbaum, as a newly employed civilian

with "expert knowledge', maintained considerable influence over McHugh's
decisions.

In his efforts to modernize Evanston Police Department and

make crucial changes in organizational policy, McHugh frequently chose
the more theoretical advise of Rosenbaum over the experiential advice
of his sworn personnel.

Such a change of policy created a visible

rift between the majority of sworn personnel (both officers and the rank
and file) and Rosenbaum as the implementer of departmental policy
and programs.

It appears that Rogers had very astutely analyzed this

situation and has taken steps to decrease the power and influence of
Rosenbaum in departmental matters by returning the division formerly
under Rosenbaum's control back to the supervision of sworn personnel.
Essentially, Rosenbaum has formally and to a greater degree been
informally stripped of much of his power and influence and Rogers has
made concrete steps forward in gaining both the respect and support of
the department.
Secondly, being disadvantaged by the initial lack of a social base
in his organization, Rogers has gone beyond the police department in
seeking support.

Rogers has a history of close community involvement

in his former role in Cincinnati.

Since his appointment in January,

Rogers has taken an active interest in the activities of the RCPC.
The design, printing, and distribution of the crime prevention newsletter
by the committee has had the official approval of his office.

He had
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made

a point of addressing the committee itself at which time he stressed

the need for the police department to work closely with the community
to make the city a better place to live.

Rogers has also responded

very positively to individual committee members requests for police
involvement in their community areas.

The credibility of the RCPC has

taken on renewed importance during the past three months.

The new

chief has both a genuine interest in productive police/community
relations and an interest in facilitating his entry into a relatively
closed organization and the community at large.

While the exact

outcome of this renewed interest in the RCPC remains to be determined,
the committee itself feels its future to be less uncertain in nature.
A general discussion of the process of cooptation has been
presented above, as it applies to the formation of the RCPC.

This

discussion has attempted to outline the discontinous manner in which
the cooptive process has been utilized, as political circumstances
and realities have changed in the city as well as within the police
organization itself.

The outset of this study began with the hypothesis

that the city government/police department viewed the formation of
this committee as a means of appeasing public demands for the reduction
of crime in the city and the assessment of the effectiveness and efficiency of the former police chief and the organization in general.
As has been demonstrated above, this cooptive process vacilated in
the intention, intensity and consequences in response to uncertain
environmental conditions.

As the control over the factors of uncer-

tainty changed, so did the use of cooptive strategies.

Once the former

chief had announced his retirement and the Police Management Study
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was underway, the pooling of public sentiments and the threat of
disruptive social protest in the form of presentations to the council,
was lessened.

The RCPC became a relatively neutral body in the eyes

of city/police administration and therefore official attention was
withdrawn from its operations.

With the inception of the new police

chief, the RCPC has become the object of renewed attention as a means
of developing and broadening a community social base in the face of
intraorganizational uncertainty.

As previously mentioned, this

community social base was one alternative action or resource which
McHugh chose not to develop in the face of controversy.

While the

selection of the new chief was very much geared towards a candidate
with a strong community background, the development of close police/
community relations provides Rogers with a visible sense of legitimacy
in the eyes of the police organization as well as the city in general.
The strategy to be chosen by the new city manager (as of yet not
selected) towards the RCPC as a city wide organization remains to be
seen.
Residential Crime Prevention Committee
Evolution of Organization
The Residential Crime Prevention Committee developed as part of
the Comprehensive Crime Prevention grant.

As previously mentioned,

community organizations were selected from a list of 800 community
groups listed at the public library as being based in Evanston.

The

Urban Affairs Department at Northwestern University had been contracted
to research the activities and concerns of both community groups and

77

private citizens.

These results were then submitted to the police

department and letters were sent out to community groups on file at
the library.

Individual citizens were also notified via the Evanston

Review that such a committee was being formed.
Three open meetings were held in the summer of 1981.

In September

the police department attempted to bring some closure to the formation
of the committee by designating those attending the September 22, 1981
meeting as the "official" crime prevention committee.

According to

members of the resource committee, this was done because the same
people were not attending the meetings regularly and thus the organizational structure and goals of the committee could not be formulated
in an orderly manner.

Thirteen community organization leaders and

three individual residents comprised the committee in addition to a
four member Resource Committee selected by the police department.
Three of these four persons on the Resource Committee were members of
the police department.

Two were police officers and one was the

Director of Planning and Research (a civilian position),

The fourth

member was a Professor of Sociology and Journalism at Northwestern
University.

Although as an employee of the police department the author

had been aware of the general content of the grant, involvement had
been exclusively with the planning and collection of data for a burglary study as another part of the grant.
There was no personal involvement with the conception or organization of the RCPC prior to the formation of the committee on Sept.
22, 1981.

The first four months the RCPC was in existence, the meetings
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were chaired by Frank Kaminski, one of the officers on the Resource
Committee.

Kaminski attempted to get the committee to elect a chair-

person and secretary in the first meeting, however, the uncertainty
surrounding the goals and objectives of the committee, made community
leaders unwilling to make this decision immediately.

Also, none of

the committee members knew each other prior to involvement with the
RCPC.

This fact coupled with the lack of clarity surrounding their

role in this committee made members prefer to sit back and observe the
flow of events before committing themselves to the selection of officers.

The Resource Committee outlined and distributed an agenda at the

outset of each meeting.

They were also responsible for taking minutes,

having them typed up and distributed to members prior to the next
meeting.
In January, 1982, the RCPC finally elected a chairperson and a
co-chairperson.

Since that time, this chairperson has presided over

these meetings and has been responsible for moving things forward in
terms of working through proposed agenda items.

The Resource Com-

mittee still maintains tight control over the committee structure and
agenda items.

This is partially due to the fact that the chairperson

(and indeed the committee in general) still depends a great deal on
the Resource Committee for guidance and direction.

The uncertain

future of the committee and the uncertainty of organizational goals
which plagues the RCPC, makes members unwilling or unable to maintain
a more marked independence from the Resource Committee.
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Secondly, this dependence is partially due to the fact that the
police chief has the sole responsibility of authorizing all documents
or issuances of this committee.

Since there has been no direct

communication with the new police chief until the middle of March
(1982), committee members have had to rely on the Resource Committee
as an intermediary entity.
Lastly, this dependence may be attributed to the Resource
Committee's vested interest in fulfilling the objective of designing,
distributing and measuring the effects of a community crime prevention
newsletter.

This objective has been the major motivating force behind

the educational process initiated by the Resource Committee.

Although

overtly stressing at each meeting that the objectives of the RCPC were
to be established by the community leaders themselves, the Resource
Committee had been successful in "coopting" these leaders into establishing the newsletter as a top priority.

A detailed discussion of

this process is presented below in the section entitled "Establishing
Organizational Goals".
At the present time, the committee's role in the development of
the newsletter is nearly at a close.

The format and the tone of these

meetings will be expected to shift somewhat now that the Resource Committee has been successful in achieving its major objective.

In an in-

terview with the committee chairperson, a personal interest in the
development of a neighborhood watch network was very prominent.

There

have already been signs that this will be the next program objective
as the chairperson has requested that a package be presented to the
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committee by resource personnel for consideration.

It remains to

be seen whether interaction patterns will change now that the time
constraints and structure imposed by the Resource Committee have produced the outcome they intended.

It may be that the RCPC will

now take more initiative in developing the individual interests of
community leaders.

This situation could lead to an interesting

process of negotiation on the future goals and objectives of the
committee.

It also holds the possibility of cooptation by the more

powerful members of the committee. The distribution of power among
committee members will be discussed in the section on interaction
patterns.

Discussion will now turn to a descriptive analysis of in-

dividual community leaders and the organizations/area they represent.
Figure 2 represents a map of the municipality in question depicting the community areas respresented by the RCPC.

As

Figure 2

indicates, many areas of Evanston are not represented on the committee.
As explained in an earlier section, this committee was formed by a
process of self selection.

While those groups represented on the com-

mittee do not represent the only community groups concerned with the
issue of crime and fear of crime, there do appear to be similarities
in the type of areas which most of these groups represent.

While

many areas in Evanston contain a characteristic mix of housing stock
(single family homes versus apartments), income levels and race, the
majority of community areas represented on the RCPC, are white middle
class areas.

The community leaders themselves are characteristically

between the ages of 25 and 40.

Many are young professionals with a
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vested interest in improving or maintaining the current quality of
lif~:.

in the neighborhood as an acceptable

11

family" atmosphere.

This

is consistent with previous research on citizen involvement in community organizations and issues within the community as a whole
(Lavrakus, 1981).
Ten of the community leaders are male, three are female.
individual residents are female and one is male.

Two

While the majority

of committee members are clearly male, the female members have been
very prominent in the proceedings of this committee.
discussed further in the following section.

This will be

Many of the committee

members represent relatively small geographical areas.

This

is not surprising once community leaders' emphases and interest in the
mobilization of neighbors is understood.

The members of the RCPC are

very much concerned with eradicating the anonymity in their own neighborhoods.

They view their involvement in the RCPC and the development

of neighborhood crime prevention programs as one method of accomplishing this goal.

Several leaders have successfully combined the

develop~

ment of the crime prevention newsletter with other neighborhood concerns (traffic and street lighting, as well as the exchange of informal informa.tion such as recipes and tips) and attracted a variety of
people to their neighborhood meetings.

This development is another

reason why committee members have not been included to protest the
structure and objectives imposed by the Resource Committee--the outcome of the newsletter has not been entirely to their disadvantage.
Discussion will now proceed to the patterns of interaction which have
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developed between individual committee members, between members of the
larger committee and the Resource Committee and between various subgroups within the committee itself.
Patterns of Interaction
In the initial meetings of the RCPC there were no defined patterns of interaction other than random discussions between committee
members and the Resource Committee.

The basic reason for this was the

fact that none of the committee members oreviouslv knew each other nor
had anv of their organizations worked together ori previous projects.
With the exception of one committee member, none of the committee
memberos had previously worked with the police department or members of
the Resource Committee.

As previously discussed, this situation was a

major reason for the committee's initial reluctance to elect a chairperson or secretary and their heavy reliance on the Resource Committee
for direction.
As the Resource Committee continued the education process on
crime prevention strategies and committee members began to formulate
their own interests in crime prevention, more specific patterns of
interaction began to emerge.

Area interests and problems specific

to certain organizations began to appear.

During the initial stages

of development committee members participated on a somewhat equal basis.

However, as specific interests began to surface, two changes in

their patterns of interaction were observed.
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First, committee members representing community organizations
began to be more vocal and more influential in discussions and decision
making.

The Resource Committee itself, while recognizing the individ-

ual resident's right to be a part of the RCPC, did not have as great
an interest in either the ideas or opinions of these individuals.

The

general aim of the RCPC was community involvement, and while these
individual residents were part of the larger Evanston community, they
did not have one basic resource to offer the Resource Committee or
the committee at large--a social base or membership contituency.

The

Resource Committee was in need of a community network for the distribution and testing of the crime prevention newsletter.

Since this was

their main initial objective, these individual residents were not in
a position to offer a valuable resource to the police representatives.
Within the functioning of the RCPC itself, these individual
members gradually participated less and less in discussion or in the
generating of ideas.

Other members, as representatives of groups,

could voice the concerns or even demands of their contituencies more
readily because they had the implication of "numbers" behind them.
These individual members themselves appeared to view themselves as
less and less able to add anything of value to the proceedings.

The

general disengagement of these individuals was the result of two
processes.

First, they were constantly reminded that they were "dif-

ferent" from the rest of the committee members by inevitable references
to the geographical areas represented by other members.

Issues such

as the distribution of the newsletters by community group members and
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the many discussions on how to mobilize community members to actively participate in community affairs and how to maintain a high level
of participation futther reinforced this separation.

Other committee

members reinforced this exclusion by dismissing the comments made by
these individual members as unimportant in such ways as not commenting
or reacting to their contributions, or stating outright that individual committee members' topics were not the immediate concern of the
committee as a whole.
As a result, one individual resident has withdrawn completely
from participation in the committee and two others have reverted to
intermittent attendance in the last two months.

Two of these three

are female and it might be ;peculated that sex is probably an intervening variable in this process.

The remaining individual resident

participant is a black male who comes from a lower income area of
Evanston.

On the occasions when this man has interjected comments

or concerns, he has had difficulty articulating his ideas in an
understandable way.

This appears to be due to a level of education

somewhat lower than the general education levels of the RCPC as a
whole.
Based on the above discussion, it can be concluded that the influence of these individual residents in the activities of the RCPC
have decreased as the influence of other members has increased.

This

general decline appears to be the result of a general lack of resources
which these individual residents are able to offer the committee.
deficiency in resources is due in part to the lack of a social base

This
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behind these members and also to the social characteristics these
members bring with them.
The second change which has occurred in terms of interaction
patterns has been the emergence of a selected core of individuals
who are more powerful in committee policy making.
members who comprise this influential core.

There are four

Richard Clark was elect-

ed by an unanimous vote as chairperson of the RCPC.
the community designated as Area 1 on Figure 2.

Clark represents

Clark is approximate-

ly thirty-five years of age and holds a college degree and a professional job.
area.

He and his wife are relatively new homeowners in this

Clark's basic responsibility is presiding over the actual

meetings and seeing to it that discussions are limited to the issues
on the agenda and in organizing new agenda items for future meetings.
Prior to his election, Clark had voiced dissatisfaction (in a personal
interview) with the direction the committee had taken in the initial
stages of development.

His personal view was that the committee had

been influenced by the "hidden agenda" of Rosenbaum which had resulted in the selection of the newsletter as the committee's first priority.
Clark's own interest lies with the development of a neighborhood
crime watch program.

This interest has since come to the forefront

now that the basic project of the newsletter has been accomplished.
Clark was not part of the newsletter subcommittee.
Camille Lee is a sim:le fe!male between the aszes of 25 and 30.
She represents the Elks Park Neiehborhood Association which is designated as Area 3 in Figure 2.

Lee resides in an apartment complex
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(typical of most of the area she represents) with her seriously ill
mother.

Lee holds a degree in elementarv education with aspirations

of studying landscaping and environmental desi2n at Harvard University.
She is currently unemPloved and has been unable to find a iob for
aoProximatelv one vear.

Lee is the most powerful person on the RCPC.

Although Lee is not an elected member of the RCPC. she has been
a ma;or force behind the writing of the newsletter itself and in getting it printed at a reasonable cost bv a friend who is a printer.

She

has been the prime motivating force behind the design and authorship
of the newsletter.

She has also developed a strong working relation-

ship with Deputy Chief Logan, who is the division head of the Communitv
Relations division of the police department.

Logan is the person

responsible for the administration of CCCPP but does not attend the
RCPC meetings.

Therefore Lee has had to go beyond the power structure

of the RCPC and the Resource Committee in establishing this relationship.
Jean Nerenberg is a middle aged career woman from an affluent
section of the city.
school.

Nereberg's youngest child is in junior high

She represents Northwestern Neighbors, which is a relatively

flexible and fluid organization at this time.

This organization evolv-

ed from a series of block parties where Nerenberg took the initiative
to introduce the "whistle stoo" orogram followng the raoes of several
voung women in the area.
ure 2.

This areas is designated as Area 4 in Fig-
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Nerenberg also exerts an influence on activities of the committee.

She was the only person who made a formal statement to the

committee that she was not in favor of the newsletter as the top
priority of the RCPC.

She made it clear that she felt that its pur-

suit had been the decision of the Resource Committee and not the RCPC
as a whole.

It is significant that when the RCPC subcommittee charged

with the responsibility of designing and writing the newsletter was
formed, she was suggested by the Resource Committee as a member, elected by the RCPC in general and accepted the assignment.
Jim Freund is the fourth member in this core of influential members.

Freund is a young single professional person which has recent-

ly moved to the Evanston area.

He is the representative from the

Marywood Neighbors Association--the key community group behind the
original police controversy.

The geographical area which he rep-

resents is labelled Area 5 on Figure 2.

Freund speaks less frequent-

ly at RCPC meetings than do any of the other "core membeTs but has an
i~pact

on committee decisions.

He also was assigned the job of pro-

ducing the newsletter.
Marilyn Osterkamp represents the Northwestern Neighbors as does
Jean Nerenberg. Osterkamp

was initially incorporated into the RCPC

as an alternative for this organization when Nerenberg was unable to
attend meetings.

While she does not attend RCPC meetings on a reg-

ular basis, she was one of the four members of the subcommittee
charged with the responsibility of producing the community newsletter.
Osterkamp works full time in a Chicago business.

Her husband teaches

89

at Evanston High School.

She has three children, the oldest of which

is a senior in high school.
Osterkamp is more caustic in voicing her reservations concerning
the leadership and manipulation by the Resource Committee.

She would

be a more influential member in the RCPC if her attendance was not so
intermittent and her other committments spread over such a broad area.
The next several months should prove to be a time of change for
the RCPC.

The intellectual interests of the Resource Committee have,

for all practical purposes been accomplished.

Individual community

interests should begin to become more apparent and the formation
of new political factions and influence within the RCPC will no
doubt occur.
Establishing Organizational Goals
During the first meeting of the RCPC, Rosenbaum introduced the
experimental approach to the crime prevention program.

He outlined

several basic issues which he felt "would have to be considered by the
group".

"We have an approach to suggest" but as we go along we are

still faced with the question of whether it (the program to be developed) will work in Evanston.

For his experimental approach he indicated

the group would take previous local research coupled with available
national research on crime prevention techniques and decide what
approaches were appropriate for Evanston.

He stated that they would

take this research and combine it with the experience of the committee
members to decide what crimes were of major concern to Evanstonians.

90
He further stated that they would have to determine what neighborhoods
required soecial attention.

The final steo would be to test whether

the program they had developed actually work.
The first two months of RCPC meetings consisted basicallv of
educational sessions.

Lavrakus (the Professor from Northwestern)

presented data from the community group study to the group to emphasize
what things were issues to Evanston residents.

Throughout these

first months various members kept asking questions about formal support from the city and police department and whether this committee
would have any "clout" in producing needed changes.

One of the main

thrusts of this concern centered on member's unwillingness to expend
time and energy on projects which would not have the official support
of the city nor result in any positive programmatic changes.
During these meetings Rosenbaum talked frequently of "the need
to test these things out."

Recommendations had been drawn up by

Lavrakus and Rosenbaum which were based on the Northwestern study.
Members were asked at the second meeting to prioritize these recommendations.

Several recommendations pertaining to the activities of

a crime prevention unit at the police department were given high
priority but the actual recommendation stating that the crime prevention unit at Evanston Police Department should be expanded was rated
4
as a low priority.
4

One member actually pointed this out at a later meeting. This situation indicated that the Resource Committee was asking them to vote
on recommendations which they did not understand at that time.
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Various members continued to voice their particular interests
and goals in terms of committee activities.

One community group was

particularly interested in reducing the fear of crime (represented by
a female member).

Several members were very interested in activities

which neighbors would be involved in (developing a block watch was of
particular interest).
The Resource Committee allowed these first few meetings to be
relatively fluid in nature.

While they did have a pre-arranged agenda,

there were no strenuous efforts to structure discussion to particular
issues.

This situation did no·.: occur uutil the third meeting.

Both

Kaminski and Rosenbaum began to subtly guide the discussions to particular issues on the agenda.

When members would bring up a topic or go

off on a tangent not pertinent to the immediate topic at hand, one of
the Resource Committee members would interject after the member
finished speaking to prevent responses from other members on what had
just been said.
At the outset, RCPC members were very concerned about the objectives/goals of the committee and the particular role which they were
expected to play.

Questions such as "what is the objective of this

committee" and "what is the role of the police vis a vis the citizenry?" were expresed by all members.

ucated citizenry

~vhich

The RCPC is composed of an ed-

is very much concerned with their neighborhoods.

They have consistently shown themselves to be a group requiring specific goals be outlined as a part of their involvement.

While the ma-

jority of them did not have solidly formulated objectives when the
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committee was initiated, they have made it clear that they needed
concrete projects and objectives to ensure their continued involvement in the RCPC.
In contrast to community leaders, the Resource Committee had very
specific goals in mind when this committee was formed.

As previously

mentioned, the RCPC was written into the crime prevention grant two
years earlier.

Also written into the grant was an "experiment" de-

signed to evaluate the effectiveness of programs to be designed by
the RCPC.

There are three ways in which a crime prevention program

can be evaluated.

These measures consist of 1) measurement of com-

pliance and/or participation of citizens 2) measure of whether people
feel safer or not and 3) whether crime is numerically reduced or not.
Since the EPD received funding for only one and one half years of the
originally projected three year grant and the RCPC was not scheduled
to begin until the second year, a numerical measurement of crime was
not a feasible short term assessment of the impact of the crime
prevention programs developed by the RCPC.

To measure participation

and feelings of safety would require the rapid development and implementation of a crime prevention program which could be evaluated before the grant expired in June of 1982.

The design of such a research

project in such a short period of time was virtually impossible.
Designing a community crime prevention news·letter appeared to
be a solution to the time constraints.

The newsletter would be a

concrete program which could be designed and distributed in a relative-
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ly short period of time.

Distribution could be made via RCPC com-

munity leaders according to a pattern determined by the Resource
Committee.

The Resource Committee determined that 3,000 newsletter

would be distributed each month for three months, with 1,500 of these
containing actual crime information.
receive this letter each month.

These same households would

At the end of the three month period,

a random digit dialing survey would be conducted to determine whether
citizens receiving the specific crime information had altered their
protective behaviors or changed in their attitudes towards crime in
Evanston.
As previously mentioned, the first three meetings of the RCPC
were relatively fluid in terms of set;ing objectives and policy.

How-

ever, in the fourth meeting, the Resource Committee coopted the RCPC
members into making the development and distribution of the newsletter
the first priority of the committee.

This was not a "sudden" show of

force by the Resource Committee but was a gradual process which culminated at this particular meeting.
Rosenbaum had vaguely outlined the experimental method to be
employed in the "feasibility" test.

However, no mention was made of

this feasibility test in conjunction with a particular crime prevention program.

In the second meeting the choice of producing the news-

letter was introduced by the Resource Committee.

Many RCPC members

regarded the Resource Committee's initial role as one of educating the
community leaders.

This was a necessary part of the proceedings
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because the majority of the committee members involved had no previous
experience in crime prevention nor were they even aware of previous
programs existent in other cities.

The Resource Committee distribut-

ed a summary of crime prevention strategies published by the Illinois
Law Enforcment Commission.
Lavrakus summarized information which had been collected on which
particular issues were of concern to the majority of Evanstonians
and assured committee members that crime was a major concern of most
people.
city.

Lavrakus provided this information broken down by area of the
He compared people's perceptions of the severity of crime in

their area with the actual incidents of crime to demonstrate the importance of educating the citizenry.

Kaminski presented findings from

a study of EPD personnel concerning attitudes towards crime prevention
in conjunction with a participative citizenry.
The contention here is not that this dissemination of information
was unimportant but rather this was a necessary step for the committee
as a whole to begin to participate in the development of any crime
prevention program.

However, the skillful way in which this educa-

tion process was carried out and the selection of the newsletter as a
top priority at the fourth meeting, were results of a pre-conceived
set of objectives on the part of the Resource Committee.

The news-

letter project was introduced as a motion by the Resource Committee
and carried through by a majority vote.

Several members had made

comments that they believed that a newsletter was not a bad idea but
a concrete, expanded prevention program was needed to involve people
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in the neighborhoods.

This was a major concern of most members--

they were seeking ways to mobilize and involve citizens in their areas
in a neighborhood effort.

The week following the passing of this

motion, the meeting minutes stated that the motion had been carried
through unanimously.

One female member objected to this statement,

expressing that she was not in support of the newsletter as the first
priority of the committee and wanted to be recorded as such.

Rosen-

baum responded to her objection with the statement that since she had
failed to attend the previous meeting and had failed to send an
alternative, the vote had been based only on those present.
Indepth interviews with committee members indicated in all but
one case, that the development of the newsletter had not been their
main objective.

The majority of committee members were interested in

developing a block/neighborhood watch program which would involve
their organizational membership--not in generating "more paper which
won't even be read".

Committee members were confused as to how they

"had become committed to the nemsletter".

It was unanimously felt

that the police department had "ulterior motives" involved in the
selection of the newsletter as a major project.

Committee members

were more willing to attribute these motives to a particular member of
the Resource Committee rather than to the committee as a whole.
member was Rosenbaum.

This

Rosenbaum was believed to be operating from a

"hidden agenda" in his involvement in the RCPC.

All but one RCPC

member interviewed voiced a distrust of Rosenbaum's motives and felt
that they were manipulating the committee.

However, each member felt
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that they were gleaning sufficient rewards from their participation
to warrant their cooperation in carrying out the newsletter project
and felt that once this project was out of the way, they could begin
to work on projects more pertinent to the interests of their community
areas.

At this point it must be concluded that a second level of

cooptation has taken place.
The RCPC was initiated with statements that decisions on goals,
objectives and the role of citizens in these programs was entirely
at their discretion.

The first few meetings were conducted with"an

aura of "fluidity" with a subtle thread of educational bias interwoven.

Had committee members been more educated in terms of crime

prevention strategies, tactics and programs, it is doubtful that the
Resource Committee would have been so successful in initiating the
newsletter as the first objective.

The introduction of this motion a

a later point in time would have found itself up against a less
naive and a more educated committee and would probably have had a
more difficult time being passed.
Secondly, time was a crucial factor for the resource committee
in terms of producing a measurable program in an extremely short
period of time (seven months).

As Rosenbaum stated at the first meet-

ing, "the Evanston Police Department has an interest in moving things
along.

If we don't move along, we will be in touch with the chair-

person to discuss it" (the chairperson to be elected by the committee
itself).

CHAPTER V
MOTIVATIONAL INFLUENCES
In the previous chapter the use of the Residential Crime Prevention Committee as a cooptive strategy of the city government was discussed.

Results indicate that the RCPC was not conceived as a cooptive

strategy but did take on varying degrees of importance as the police
controversy gained intensity and ebbed with the retirement of the former police chief and the resignation of the city manager.

It has been

hypothesized that the new police chief will maintain an active interest
in the future of the RCPC as a means of establishing a solid social
base within the community.
The RCPC itself has also been discussed in detail.

It has been

demonstrated that the evolution of the RCPC was the result of a self
selection process among Evanston community groups.

This self selection

process indicated that the police department/city government did not
utilize a direct method of "absorbing" the protesting community group
(Marywood) but rather used an indirect method of absorbing an "conflict" on the issue of crime within the Evanston community as a whole.
In essence the police department did not reduce the dissension from
Marywood but prevented an informal network from developing which
could enlist the support of large portions of the Evanston population.
Modern social movement theories, most notably the Resource
97
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Mob~lization per~pective~

have emphasized the organizational problem of

maintaining a high level of participation of members throughout the
life of the movement itself.

In light of the previous discussion

con~

cerning the strong "influence" of the Resource Committee on the setting
of RCPC goals, it seems appropriate at this time to discuss the various factors which motivated individual members to continue participation even when they were in opposition to the newsletter as a major
goal.

In order to adequately understand this process, three specific

periods of social unrest in the history of the United States will be
briefly discussed.

These are the Progressive Era of the early 1900's,

the welfare movement of the 1930's and 1940's, and the social movements
of the 1960's.

Broadly speaking, the Progressive Era characterized

a period of middle class reform which did not aim to change the basic
institutions of the democratic society.
number of basic goals.
Americanization

This movement encompassed a

Among these goals were such issues as:

the

of non-WASP immigrants, an improved quality of life

for the working class, improved consumer goods and public services.
the end of corruption and corporate rapaciousness, and the streamlining
and professionalization of the government.
A second broad based era in the history of U.S. social protest
is characterized by the welfare rights and industrial workers movements
of the 1930's and 1940's.

Piven and Cloward (1977) provide a detailed

discussion of the goals of these movements.

It is the contention of

these authors that the movements themselves were relatively ineffective
in realizing major movement goals because of inherent inequalities.
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A third period of pervasive social protest can be
as the social movements

o~

the 1960's,

identi~!ed

Li,ke the movements

ot

the

1930's and 1940's, these movements were concerned with affecting major
structural changes in American society,

The 1970's and 1980's have

seen the relative failure of the American Left in the movements of
the 60's being transformed into more workable goals of social change
which are aimed at the conmrunity level,

These community movements

are viewed by the left as a first step to developing national networks
geared towards

changing major social institutions.

Crime is just one among many social issues which has surfaced
with this pervasive concern over community life.

It is an issue

which is capable of illiciting strong emotional reactions from citizens
through a type of snowballing effect.

The magnitude of social protest

which this snowball effect is capable of illiciting from a community
is considerable.

The response of the Evanston police/city administra-

tion can thus be viewed as a "anticipatory" response aimed at alleviating such a movement before it can gain momentum.
from which the RCPC must be viewed.

This the context

Discussion will next center

around the placement of individual RCPC members and their motivations
for continued participation in the RCPC.

The remainder of this chapt-

er will thus seek to place the police controversy and the RCPC within
this social climate and attempt to explain the continued participation
of RCPC members in the fact of conflicting RCPC and Resource Committee
goals.
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Citizen Participation:

Motivating Factors

In contrast to the macro-structural issues of social movements
in the 1960's, the 1970's and the 1980's have produced an abundance
of grassroot associations aimed at issues at the micro-level.

In an

article on the American Left, Richard Flacks summarizes the distinction between the social movements of the 60's as opposed to the movements of the 70's and 80's by distinguishing two types of action-action geared towards making history and action geared towards making
life.

The movements of the 60's were concerned with affecting the

shape of society by directing social change at the most basic level
of our democratice insitutions.

However, for the majority of people,

this type of action is too abstract and removed from their real everyday lives.
The urban social movements which characterize the 70's and 80's
represent a shift of focus from basic democratic principles at the
national level to the actual application of participatory democracy
at the local level.

It is not surprising that the cities are becoming

the focus of such movements, especially the older U.S. cities, because
these cities represent the most concentrated examples of the political,
economical and social problems facing the people of this country.
The changing urban milieu for the people who have either chosen
or are forced by necessity to remain in the cities has mobilized many
citizens into action to prevent any more drastic changes from affecting the quality of their lives.

These issues range from such things
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as redlining to rent control, real estate speculation, stabilizing
changing neighborhoods, as well as crime prevention and reduction.
Various factors have been cited as precluding increased citizen
involvement in political affairs.

Among these are:

•

The hard economic reality facing the majority of American
citizens today (a reality, until recently, whose greatest
impact was felt exclusively by the lower classes).

•

The increasing domination of "big business" in all aspects of
social and political life.

•

The increq.se in social problems such as crime, poverty, and
social services due to a declining tax base and rising proportion of the needy.
The factors above represent only a partial list of structural

factors which contribute to the increase in citizen's involvement in
political and ommunity affairs.

Through the grassroots movements

people actually began to defend their established ways of life.

People

have a vested interest in maintaining their community or neighorhood
because their culture is rooted there.

Many people are seeking to

recapture some control over thier lives by rebuilding a sense of
community and some democratic control over their lives.

It is from

this perspective that the general level of citizen involvement in crime
prevention shall be analyzed.
The above shift in political focus has occurred in the area of
crime.

While crime has been a focus of concern since the 1960's, the

mode in which this concern has been expressed hds changed.

In the

1960's concern about crime was expressed on the national level.

The
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Law Enforcement Assistance Administration (LEAA) was created during
this period.

This federal agency was endowed with large sums of

money which it contracted out to independent research teams across the
country.

The many research projects funded by the LEAA were designed

to provide a better understanding of crime as a national problem and
recommendations for reducing the crime rate in general.

LEAA was also

prominent in funding police departments in their efforts to improve
such areas as information retrieval systems, communications and crisis
intervention.

While the broad based political interests of the 60's

did not preclude the existence of community politics, these interests
did tend to be submerged by such concerns as the Free Speech Movement,
the Anti-War Movement and the Civil Rights Movement.
As the 1970's and 1980's saw a shift of interest from the macroissues to micro-issues, a comparable shift in concern over crime
occurred.

In 1973 LEAA first made funding available to individual

communities or community groups in the area of crime prevention.

Since

that time a wide array of crime prevention programs and strategies
have been implemented across the country.
In placing Evanston within this context, it is importanct to
understand the general political atmosphere of Evanston itself.

Evan-

ston has a tradition of active citizen involvement in political affairs,
whether it be in local issues or national interests such as those
advocated by the Peace and Freedom Party.

This tradition is one

factor which makes the city administration very sensitive and
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aware of community opinion.

This traditionally active citizenry

coupled with the general shift from national to community issues is
partially responsible for the emergence of crime as community issue
in Evanston in 1980.

Another contributing factor to this emergence

is the dramatic increase in burglary and theft which occurred in
Evanston in 1979.
The initial development of Marywood Neighbors Association can
be seen as an attempt at '-'participatory democracy".
of importance here.

Two issues are

First, the city administration, most notably

the city manager, had long been criticized for exerting too much
control and influence over the city council in developing city
policy.

There were factions within the Evanston community who

believed him to be very effective and efficient when it came to
controlling financial functions of the city administration.

However,

it was felt that when citizen concerns pertaining to issues which
affected the

~uality

of their community and neighborhood lives were

voiced, they fell on deaf ears.
Marywood formed around the interests of neighborhood people
attempting to regain a "quality of life" within the neighborhood
which felt had been lost.

The perceived increase in crime (particular-

ly burglary) must be seen as a reaction of people who felt they no
longer had this control.

Crime was no longer an "unreal" phenomena

which happened to other people or which they heard about on the news.
It had become a reality because it was happening to many of them
and their neighbors.

Their homes were no longer immune to being
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burglarized.

Burglary had in fact become a very real possibility in

certain areas of the city.

Some residents had found themselves burg-

larized repeatedly.
The issue of crime happened to become the focus of these regenerative efforts largely because of these circumstances.

There had

been this dramatic increase in the number of burglaries in Evanston
(not just the perceptions of citizens).

Citizens coming into contact

with other citizens and sharing their own experiences served to
mobilize an already growing community concern for the neighborhood.
Participation in voluntary organizations such as community
groups can also be analyzed on the level of individual participant's
motivation.

Wilson (1975) has provided a typology for investigating

citizen incentives for participation.

He distinguishes between material,

solidary (expressive) and purposive (instrumental) incentives.

Material

incentives are clearly not pertinent to the particular issue at hand
because they refer to tangible rewards such as money or goods.

However,

expressive and instrumental incentives, as well as a combination of
the two, provide a good framework for analyzing the personal motivation
of RCPC committee members in being involved in the development of the
crime prevention program.
First glance may indicate that there should be no concern with
personal motivations for participation since we a=e dealing with a
social group and a social process.

However, research has shown thac

these personal motivating factors must be taken into consideration
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attempting to account for the emergence of a "social movement" on whatever scale and the continued participation of citizens in the social
movement, committee or whatever the social entity.

In other words,

what is of concern here, is what social exchanges RCPC members are
getting out of their continued involvement in the crime prevention
program, even when they are aware of the cooptive nature of committee
goals up to the present point in time.

This study will attempt to

account for this continued involvement by an anlysis of individual committee members' goals and personal motivations for involvement.
Two methods were employed to identify motivating factors behind
RCPC members' participation in the committee.

The interview method

provided the most useful data concerning individual members, their

.

organization and the relationships of these groups to the larger community.

A questionnaire was also utilized in this endeavor, however,

it did not prove to be as useful as the interview method.

The thirteen

questionnaires were mailed out with only five of the questionnaires returned.

Of those five questionnaires returned, certain difficulties

with both the content and format of questions became apparent.

Several

community groups constituted ad hoc assemblies which were attempting
to organize and mobilize community residents.

They therefore did not

possess a "social history" from which to draw answers on problem
resolution tactics.

The activities of other groups were geared more

towards the social interactions of community residents than the
solutions to particular community problems.

In this sense, the quest-

ionnaire was very useful in identifying motivation and organizational
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differences between community group leaders and their organizations.
Some of these differences did not become apparent in the interviews.
Clark, the elected chairperson of the RCPC, stated in an interview. that his interest in crime and crime prevention was spurred by
a two-fold concern.

First, there was the perception of an increased

danger to the personal welfare of his wife in his absence.

He was

no longer comfortable with her coming and going after dark or in
particular areas of Evanston when he was not with her.

Secondly, he

and his wife had recently invested in the purchase of a home and had
begun to view the neighborhood where this home was located as the
neighborhood where they would raise their future family.

This observa-

tion is congruent with other research (Lavrakus, 1980) which indicates
that people who are homeowners, married, and have children are more
likely to be involved in activities geared towards the preservation
or improvement of community life.

Clark has been very outspoken in

his own interest in developing neighborhood crime watch programs.
These programs are based on a shared sense of responsibility and concern among members of the same geographical area (usually a block).
They typically serve a two fold purpose of developing a network of
people watching out for each other and protecting each other's property, and in removing the anonymity common among residents in urban
areas today.
Lee is probably the most up front about both her communal and
personal reasons for involvement in the RCPC.

She too, is very inter-

ested in developing shared interest and values among community resi-
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dents.

She uses the meetings where she reports the activities and

progress of the RCPC to her organizational members as an opportunity
to develop other organizational issues.

She is very much concerned

with mobilizing her constituency and in keeping them actively involveed in the neighborhood.

She is a single, career person committed to

alleviating the anonymity of urban life which she feels is aggravated
by the fact that a larger portion of the housing stock in her area is
apartment dwellings.
In an interview, Lee has stated that she does not object to the
"manipulative" tactics employed by the Resource Committee in producing
the newsletter, because it has facilitated some of her own goals in
the community.

She also stated that it would be dishonest not to admit

that she achieves a certain level of personal satisfaction from being
involved in a city-wide project (keeping in mind she was a key figure
in the designing, writing and printing of the newsletter itself), and
in being able to educate fellow community residents.
Nerenberg came to the RCPC as a resident who had become increasingly alarmed with the vulnerability of being female in an
urban community and in the perceived threat to the personal safety
of females.

From the start she was against the development of a

community crime prevention newsletter as it only served to generate
more paper" in a world already plagued with an abundance of written
material.

Nerenberg maintained that the community was in need of

concrete, direct action crime prevention programs such as whistle
stop and block watches.

In contrast to the majority of RCPC members
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her main concern was with personal protection from violent crimes
rather than home protective behaviors.

Despite her integral involve-

ment in the RCPC subcommittee charged with the production of the
newsletter, Nerenberg has stated that she will terminate her involvement in the RCPC if it does not now move on to the development of
concrete crime prevention strategies.

Her identity as a female forms

a distinct basis for her involvement in the RCPC and her interest
in crime prevention in general.

Research has shown that females are

typically more concerned about the possibility of violent crime and
score higher in measurements of fear of crime (Baumer, 1979; Baumer
and Rosenbaum, 1980).
Ivan Lippiz is the only organizational leader who does not
represent a specific geographical area.

Lippitz is the representative

from a four member committee titled the Evanston Youth Commission.
This is an officially sponsored arm of the Human Relations Commission.
The commission is concerned with all aspects of the community relating to youth, be it gangs or safety in the schools.

Lippitz has been

a less influential member in the RCPC than has the three previously
described members.

He has continually attempted to get the "role of

youth in crime prevention" as an agenda item for discussion for the
last six months.

He claims that he has continually been embarrassed

when the youth commission has inquired as to what they can do to
contribute to the activities and program objectives of the RCPC,
because he has no answer for them.
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Lippitz became involved in several community organizations
geared towards youth problems during the past two years.

This he

attributed to the death of his sixteen year old son in a pedestrian
crosswalk in front of Evanston High School.

Lippitz is a licensed

clinical psychologist and claims that community involvement and
specifically involvement in the activities pertaining to the youth
of Evanston, have been very therapeutic for him.

He attributes his

involvement in RCPC as having both an intellectual and emotional
interest.
The above situational discussions have been presented as examples of both the community and personal factors motivating RCPC
members' involvement in crime prevention.
be cited.

More examples could easily

However, the purpose here is not to give a personal account

of each RCPC member, but to illustrate the broad spectrum of factors
involved in the participation of these citizens in the RCPC and some
of the issues involved in their continued participation.
The second purpose for including this section on motivational
factors is to show why a group of residents continue to participate
in a committee which they felt has been manipulated and guided by
forces other than themselves from the start.

Despite the fact that

most RCPC members were against the pursuit of the newsletter as a
major goal, the satisfaction of several community and personal goals
has occurred at the same time.

Another factor accounting for con-

tinued involvement has been the anticipation that since the Resource
Committee's major goal has now been achieved, the RCPC can now move
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along to a pursuit of goals which are of more particular interest to
themselves and their organizations.
Resource Committee
As previously stated, the Resource Committee consists of a
four member team possessing various levels of expertise considered
salient to the objectives of the RCPC as a part of the CCCPP.

A brief

discussion of each member will follow.
Hank White has been the Crime Prevention Officer for EPD
for approximately ten years.

He has consituted what might be called

the crime prevention unit of the department single handedly, prior to
the police department being awarded the CCCPP grant.

White represents

the person at EPD which has the most knowledge and experience concerning both crime prevention strategies and crime victims in Evanston.
He has attended several intense training sessions sponsored by both
federal and state law enforcement agencies on the issue of crime prevention.
From the outset, White has played a low profile in the RCPC
meetings.

He has been most helpful when asked specific questions by

RCPC members but exhibits no overt inclination to influence either
the proceedings or objectives of this committee.
In the early meetings, White served as the committee secretary
taking mintues and supervising their typing and distribution to members.
He presented a fifteen-minute program on the Home Security Checks.
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These surveys are a service EPD provides to victims of burglary and
to other residents who request them.

White has been the only person

from EPD conducting these surveys and he gives this as the reason
the service has not been advertised more in the media.

He also

showed two crime prevention movies which he used when lecturing to
community organizations requesting his services.

White's role in the

RCPC is basically just a continuation of his professional role at
EPD.

He has not captialized on the RCPC as an opportunity to gain

community support for an expanded crime prevention unit which is
badly needed.

He also has not advocated any specific crime prevention

strategies in the course of the meetings.

Members of the RCPC have

indicated in interviews that they hold him in the highest regard
and do not feel that he is part of the "cooptive" process operating
in the RCPC.

This can be attributed to the fact that White has not

exploited or attempted to influence RCPC policy in any way that would
benefit him.

In fact recently White was named Crime Prevention Of-

ficer of the Year by a regional law enforcement board, but did not
even mention this to the RCPC.

White's supervisor made a casual

reference to this during an RCPC meeting.
Frank Kaminski is a police officer at EPD who has been assigned a desk job in the Training Section and subsequently was assigned
an academic role in the CCCPP.

Kaminski holds a Masters Degree in

Public Administration and has conducted and authored a number of
departmental studies in his seven years as a police officer.
formerly assigned to the Youth Section.

He was
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Kaminski's role has basically been the role of coordinator in
the RCPC meetings.

As previously stated. he chaired the RCPC meetings

for the first four months.

He still is responsible for seeing that

the minutes are typed and distributed to all members.

He is also

responsible for working with the elected chairperson in coordinating
agenda items for future meetings (although there exists other sources
of input) and in contacting RCPC members who fail to attend meetings.
The financial resources of the CCCPP also fall under this jurisdiction
(although formal approval must be obtained from the chief).

Kaminski's

basic function in the RCPC has been to see that the discussions and
decision making sessions "flow" according to plan.
Lavrakus, holds a joint appointment in the Journalism and Urban
Affairs Departments at Northwestern University.
Evanston resident for eleven years.

He has also been an

At the first meeting he cited

this along with the fact that he has a wife and son, and therefore
has a vested interest in his own community.

Lavrakus also has had

considerable research experience in crime and crime related issues
such as fear of crime, victimization, and citizen participation in
crime prevention programs.

Lavrakus therefore has both an intellectual

and personal interest in the RCPC.

As described in a previous section,

he headed another research project included in the CCCPP grant.

The

aim of this project was to ascertain the concerns of residents and
community organizations in both their immediate community and the
community of Evanston at large.
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Historically, Lavrakus has had an intellectual affiliation with
Rosenbaum.

They have worked on joint research projects previously

at a private research firm and both were members of the ad hoc committee which wrote the RFP for the Police Management Study of EPD.
Rosenbaum was also instrumental in Lavrakus being awarded the community
subcontract in the RCPC.

Both Rosenbaum and Lavrakus have an academic

interest in the "feasibility test" of the community crime prevention
newsletter.
Rosenbaum represents the key figure in the Resource Committee
responsible for the introduction and pursuit of the newsletter as a
major committee goal.

The general role of the Resource Committee

in the cooptation of the RCPC in this area has been discussed earlier.
A background sketch of Rosenbaum will therefore be necessary
to illustrate his role in this cooptive process.

This will be

accomplished in terms of his participation in three roles: 1) his
role within the police organization 2) his role within the city power
structure and 3) his role in the RCPC.

All three levels are basic

for an understanding of both the motivation and impact Rosenbaum
has had on the RCPC.
Rosenbaum was hired in June of 1980 as the Director of Planning
and Research at EPD, a position previously held by a lieutenant.

His

hiring was the initial stage of the civilianization process outlined
by both the chief and the city manager as efforts to increase the
effectiveness and efficiency of the EPD.

The conversion of this

114
position was opposed by many top ranking sworn personnel.

Therefore

a degree of resentment existed prior to Rosenbaum's employment.

How-

ever, as Rosenbaum began to unfold his own academic and personal objectives in his new position, this initial resentment developed into
full-blown hostility.

A presentation of the basis of this resent-

ment is necessary in order to understand Rosenbaum's precarious position in the hierarchy and the ensuing importance of his role in the RCPC.
Rosenbaum entered the organization at the management level.
employment was resented for a number of reasons.

His

First, the position

was advertised at a much lower salary than he was hired at.

Several

lieutenants were rumored to have been interested in retiring as sworn
personnel to take the position as a civilian had the salary been advertised at a higher rate.

It was felt by several ranking officers that

Rosenbaum had pull with the city manager--that he represented an "in"
at city hall.

He was resented particularly because of his salary and

position reflected a level in the organization which police officers
worked for years to move themselves up through the rank into management positions.
He was also resented because he was a civilian and civilians
lacked the experience of being a "cop".

This issue was a particularly

salient issue because he was hired as the planner for the entire police
department.

It was reasoned that such a role had to be filled by some-

one with police experience, by someone who understood what it was like
to be a "cop on the street".

Education was also an issue which was not

greatly respected within this particular organization.
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The Record Section was officially under the direct supervision
of Captain Bennett.

Since one of Rosenbaum's major goals and re-

sponsibilities was the automation of the record keeping system, it was
necessary to work directly with Bennett unless a "go between" could be
found as a substitute.

It might be hypothesized that Rosenbaum's

support and backing of this author as the Supervisor of Records
(the second management position to be converted to a civilian position) was part of his plan to influence this section without a direct
relationship or confrontation with Bennett himself.
Bennett was one of the individuals whom Rosenbaum frequently
commented about being "threatened" and angry about him being hired
and the influence that he had begun to have on the chief.

Rosenbaum

also maintained that it was the plan at city hall to gradually squeeze
Bennett out of responsibilities and make him angry enough to retire.
Bennett was only one of many "enemies" which Rosenbaum had within the
organization.

All of these conflictive situations are

i~portant

for

understanding the background of Rosenbaum's role in the police department.
With the coming of Chief Rogers in January, Rosenbaum was
stripped of his position as the division head of the Record Section.

6

Rogers informed Rosenbaum that he was doing this to "put him in his
place:' and give him a chance to prove himself.

This has had a ma;or

6

Rosenbaum had been promoted in May 1981 by the retiring chief against
the protests of other staff who felt they better deserved the promotion because of their years of experience on the iob.
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impact on Rosenbaum;s role within the police department.

He has alwavs

been the obiect of much criticism and ooen hostilitv, howeverf he alwavs
had the backine of the former chief and the influence on the chief's
decision making.

Rosenbaum repeatedly stated that he did not need to

"fraternize" with either the rank and file or ranking officers to
establish a power base within the organization because "knowledge was
power".

His power and influence depended exclusively on his relation-

ship with the chief and to a certain extent, his influence on the city
manager who had played a prominent role in hiring him.

As previously

mentioned, both these individuals have left employment in Evanston.
Rosenbaum is faced with a situation where he formed his "power base';
exclusively on personal relationships with individuals.

Once these

individuals are replaced, his patterns of influence no longer exist.
This situation has had a observable effect on his behavior in
the RCPC meetings.

He frequently misses meetings or comes in late.

He also speaks less frequently than he did in earlier sessions.

This

power situation may have profound effects on his future involvement
in the RCPC.

Chief Rogers, when attending one meeting of the RCPC,

actually verbally reprimanded Rosenbaum for one of his statements in
front of the entire committee.

Rosenbaum confided in the author that

he was looking for employment elsewhere.

The next few months many re-

veal some interesting changes in terms of the power structure and
direction the activities of the RCPC take.
The feasibility test as written into the CCCPP. represented an
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area where Rosenbaum could exert influence on departmental and
community policy.

However, more importantly, the feasibility test re-

presented an opportunity to achieve an academic goal in an applied
setting which would prove to be the first of its kind.

An astounding

variety of crime prevention strategies have been implemented across
the country.

These strategies have been developed by citizens, sworn

personnel, academians, and a combination of all three.

However, none

of these strategies has evern been scientifically controlled and measured as to effectiveness.

Rosenbaum envisioned the feasibility test in

Evanston as a major academic breakthrough for the field and as a
significant boost for his own academic career and credentials.

It was

through Rosenbaum's personal interest in this feasibility test that the
crime prevention newsletter was introduced to the committee.

The rea-

son for the selection of the newsletter as the "experiemental condition"
to be administered has already been traced to the time and measurement
constraints of the crime prevention grant.

It can therefore be asserted

that the process of producing the newsletter was also the result of
still another level of cooptation.
Summary
It has been the main hypothesis of this study that the Residential
Crime Prevention Committee has been the object of cooptive processes
from various persons and levels of authority within the power structure of city administration.

First, the RCPC was analy3ed as the ob-

ject of the intermittent process of cooptation by the city manager and
the police chief.

It was found that the RCPC took on varying de-
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grees of importance as political circumstances changed.

What had been

initiated as one small part of a grant in developing a comprehensive
crime prevention program for Evanston, took on new political significance
when the police chief, the police department, and the city manager
came under criticism for the escalating crime problem.

City and police

officials pointed to the formation of the RCPC as a city effort to
alleviate the crime problem and develop a working relationships between the police and the community.
Community fervor subsided, partially because of the city's contracting of the Police Management Study and later because of the chief's
announcement of his forthcoming retirement.

As a result, the RCPC be-

came less significant in the eyes of the police department.

Subsequent-

ly, the city manager left the city to manage another city and thus his
interest in the RCPC subsided.
Renewed interest in the RCPC has developed through the appointment of a new police chief.

This interest has been analyzed as a factor

congruent with the chief's previous involvement in community/police
relations in another city.

It has also been attributed to the new

chief's lack of a social base in the police organization itself and
his subsequent need to develop a social base within the community.
Cooptation has also been analyzed as a process employed by the
Resource Committee on behalf of the police department.

Time and

measurement contraints imposed by the grant made the need for a rapid
deliverable product to ILEC a major concern.

By educating and struc-
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turing the RCPC in a specific way, the Resource Committee has been
successful in developing and implementing an experimental design which
will given them the needed data.
tests by RCPC members.

This process occurred inspite of pro-

It was demonstrated that this occurred because

RCPC members were still accomplishing some of the personal goals which
had motivated their original involvement.
The results of this study indicate that cooptive processes may
operate in many aspects of social life and at many levels.

The fact

that cooptive processes are often employed in combination with other
aspects of power, influence, and goal attainment is an interesting
phenomena worth investigating.
The education, guidance and influences of the Resource Committee
on the developing RCPC have been analyzed in terms of the operation of
cooptation.

However, it must also be pointed out that these forces

brought organization and direction to these meetings.

It is very like-

ly that without this guidance, the Residential Crime Prevention Committee would not be in existence today.

CHAPTER VI
CONCLUSIONS
Actual Versus Potential Social Protest
The preliminary chapters of this thesis have dealt with the historical background which precipitated the formation of the Residential
Crime Prevention Committee.

These chapters attempted to outline the

general sequence of events surrounding the police controversy and
responses made by both city and police administrators.

A careful

analysis of newspaper articles covering this controversy indicated
that only one community organization was actually involved in voicing
opposition to the police chief specifically and the police department
in general.

As previously discussed, the local newspaper played a

prominent role in "legitimizing" the concerns and demands of this
community group.

On the basis of this historical analysis, the actual

threat which this community group represented to the police department
and the city administration appears to have been negligible.

Indica-

tions are that the fervor created by the Evanston Review in this
situation would have had relatively little impact, had city officials
chosen not to respond to the charges.

Responses by city officials

merely served as additional sources of information for future newspaper articles.

Reactions by the city government provided further

legitimation for Marywood Neighbors Association as "the" voice of the
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community and provided the Evanston Review with material to carry on
a "community dialogue" and the production of "sensational copy".
Evanston as a Cooptive Case
In Selznick's study of the TVA (1949), the 'coopted' group of
voluntary organizations possessed a basic level of knowledge concerning agriculture and the education of local farmers.

This knowledge

was one of the various reasons why the TVA felt the support of these
voluntary organizations was important.

In a study of cooptation in the

communist bloc countries of Eastern Europe, Bielasiak (1980) effectively demonstrated the community party's cooptation of much needed
"expert knowledge".
The unique characteristic of the RCPC in Evanston was the fact
that this group had no knowledge base on which to structure their
participation in crime prevention.

This relative ignorance of crime

prevention strategies made the education of this committee a major
task of the Resource Committee.

In today's complex urban milieu a

protest group, whether it be a community group or a large scale
social movement, cannot effectively formulate policy or have an impact on administrative decision making without a certain expertise
in the issues involved.

This has become increasingly apparent in

such areas as environmental control and nuclear power, where citizen
groups have had to achieve a specific level of understanding of complicated technical issues in order to lobby effectively with large
corporate businesses or the government.

In the area of crim preven-
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tion, citizens who are relatively unfamiliar with the shift of modern
policing and preventative strategies, often view increased manpower
as the solution to reducing the crime rate.
In recent years, approaches to policing have begun to focus on
the interaction of the police and the community in both the prevention
of crime and the apprehension of criminal offenders.

Studies such as

Dentinger (1979), Vardalis (1979), Kelly (1981), and Auten (1981) discuss four issues which have lead to the emphasis on the interaction
of police and the community in preventing crime.

The first issue

points to the fact that traditional preventive patrol does not prevent
crime.

Preventive patrol is based on the theory of omnipresence which

assumes that random movements of highly visable patrol officers can
eliminate or substantially reduce the opportunity for the criminal act
to occur.

Studies such as the Kansas City Preventive Patrol Experi-

ment (President's Commision on Law Enforcement and Criminal Justice,
1967) or Wilson (1975) indicate that substantial increases in random
preventive patrol by police have no effect on the actual crime rate.
A second issue involved is the fact that the crime rate is continually rising--an indication that police alone cannot control
crime.

Thirdly, the fiscal state of many cities has necessitated an

actual decrease in police manpower allocation, which further reinforces
the contention that citizens must become involved in crime prevention.
A fourth issue raised with regard to traditional policing philosophy
pertains to whether crime prevention can even by considered a legitimate goal of a police department.

Thus in reality, it may not be
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an attainable goal by police alone because they cannot attack the
causes of crime.
The traditional mode of policing has been in the form of reacting to reported crimes with efforts directed specifically on apprehension rather than prevention.

However, if one were to measure

police productivity in terms of apprehension or clearance rates,
these low rates (only 12% nation wide) indicate that police are
realtively ineffective in clearing criminal cases also.

The above

considerations lead to the contention that there is a distinct need
for a re-definition of the role of police in the community.

Such

a shift in policing philosophy necessitates the re-education of the
community at large.

This is another aspect of the educational process

involved in the RCPC.
It is therefore the contention of this study that neither the
RCPC itself or the Marywood social movement organization which
precipitated the RCPC, posed actual threats to the power structure
in Evanston.

However, as the RCPC is now considerably more in tune

with crime prevention strategies and the Resource Committee has accomplished its major objective, the RCPC is thus expected to exert
considerably more influence on future policy.
The increased level of expertise among RCPC members at the
present point may be a precipitating factor to this committee becoming independent of the Resource Committee and the city/police
administration as a whole.

The RCPC could conceivably institute
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its own crime prevention programs independently or the committee itself
could disband and take their newly acquired knowledge back to their
own communities or neighborhoods and institute a program at that level.
The possibility of the RCPC becoming an independent body would
seem unlikely from the simple level of resources.

RCPC members have

thus far not invested any money from their organizations into RCPC
activities.

All expenses have been paid by the police department with

funds from the crime prevention grant.

UP to this point there has been

no need for RCPC participating organizations to contribute monetarily
nor has the police department asked for any contributions.

However,

official funding for this committee will expire in June 1982.

It has

already been indicated by a member of the Resource Committee that the
police chief expects the RCPC organizations to put up funding for the
continuation of the program.

The events of the next few months will be

crucial to the future of this committee.

It is speculated that RCPC

members and the organizations which they represent, are going to have
to benefit more directly from the activities of the RCPC before they
might be willing to invest money into the maintenance of the committee.
In light of the fact that the newsletter was not an overwhelming priority of all RCPC members, the development of specific programs more
pertinent to members interests

and needs during the next three months,

appears to be a crucial factor in the future of the RCPC.
A second factor which lessens the possibility of the RCPC
choosing to function as an independent entity is the fact that the
approval and legitimation of the police chief and the city admini-
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stration has been a central issue since the formation of the committee.
The official backing of the police department gives members a certain
amount of prestige in both their eyes and the eyes of the communities
which they represent.

Crime prevention programs and strategies are

unlikely to continue without recognition and support from the police
department.
The interaction of the police department and the community is a
crucial factor underlying modern policing philosophy.

It seems un-

likely that either the RCPC or the police department will opt for
this separation once funding is eliminated.

It seems appropriate to

question just what the police department will do if RCPC members refuse
or are unable to finance the future of the RCPC.

The police department

has invested considerable amounts of time and money into the formation
of this committee.

It has been publicized in the Evanston Review so

community members are aware of its existence.

Also, as previously

discussed, the new police chief has a vested interest in developing a
strong rapport with the community.

In light of these issues it

appears unlikely that EPD will let the RCPC simply fall by the way
side.
As has been stated previously, none of the RCPC members were involved in the original police controversy itself.

Once RCPC member

does represent Marywood Neighbors Association, however, he was not
personally involved in the controversy.

Interviews with RCPC members

indicated that the coverage which this controversy received in the
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Evanston Review had little if any influence on their interest in the
RCPC.

This further supports the contention that the RCPC did not re-

present a threat to either the

polic~

or city administration.

The per-

sonal and organizational motives of RCPC members was discussed earlier.
Challenging the city or police administration was not an objective
stated by any committee members.

All stated goals pertained to the

advancement of their own participation in the community as well as the
mobilization of residents within their community.
The thesis of this paper has been concerned with the use of
cooptive strategies by a local government/police department as a
means of neutralizing community protest.

The conception, evolution,

and organization of the Residential Crime Prevention Committee has been
examined in detail to determine whether this committee was the result
of a cooptive strategy.

In the previous chapter it has been demonstrat-

ed that the importance attributed by city and police administrators
to the RCPC has varied over time and circumstances.
This study has not found sufficient data to support the hypothesis that the RCPC was first proposed as a means of alleviating community
dissension.

However, it cannot be dismissed that the RCPC was cited

on several occasions by city/police administrators to be evidence
that the city was attempting solutions to the "problems" raised by
community leaders.

While evidence for the cooptation of the RCPC by

the police/city administration has not been found, the initial conception of the RCPC in the crime prevention grant and the particular
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timing of that conception, might be interpreted as a precipatory
move on the part of the police department.

In light of the Evanston-

ian tradition of a highly participative citizenry, and the police department's awareness of a particularly high burglary and theft rates
in 1979 (the vear the grant orooosal was written). it might be concluded that the RCPC was an "anticipatorv" move designed to prevent
crime from becoming a community issue.

Crime has been an issue of

varvine intensitv at both the community and national level since the
60's.

It is a particularly volatile issue because it has had a direct

impact on manv people's lives--whether in beine an actual victim of an
criminal act or simply experiencine the fear of crime.

Because of its

volatile nature, crime could easilv become a maior communitv issue
through a "snowballing" effect.
If the "anticipation" of such a potential controversy was behind
the conceptualization of the RCPC in 1979, it would appear to be an
astute analysis on the oart of oolice and/or citv officials.

As it

is. the RCPC served as a concillatorv resoonse when the Marvwood
erouo did in fact attemot to make crime a citv wide issue among citizens in 1980.
Whatever the motivation behind the inclusion of the RCPC in the
grant, it served to placate citizens in two ways.

In the initial stag-

es of the 1980 oolice controversv it served as an adiunct to the various
other resoonses bv oolice and citv officials.
discussed oreviouslv.

This asoect has been

Following the formation of the RCPC. Daniel
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Whitmore (one of the two major actors in the original Marvwood grouo)
attended a meeting as an alternate for Jim Freund.

Durine this meet-

ine Whitemore attemoted to activate RCPC members to act as a qrouo and
oress the citv manaqer to make orqanizational and oolicy changes at
EPD prior to the selection of a new police chief.
receptive to Whitemore's ideas.

The RCPC was not very

One committee member actually voiced

the opinion that Whitmore had political motivations behind his issues
which the RCPC did not want to be involved in.
Following this meeting, Whitmore wrote an article for the
Evanston Review, in which he called for Evanston citizens to actively
pursue this line of action.

He summed up his discussion with the

statement that the "CCCPP is every bit the sociologist's paradise that
its five-barreled name suggest." and the "only noticeable instrument
against residential burglary which has been created by the CCCPP in two
years is an advisory council of neighborhood groups that is thinking
about putting out a newsletter sometime soon" (Evanston Review, Novemher 5, 1981: 21).
Members of the RCPC were extremely angry at Whitmore's implication that the RCPC was doing nothing about the crime problem.

Richard

Clark wrote a rebuttal to Whitmore's letter where he stated "Mr
Whitmore, while you are running about clamoring for vour concerns and
denigrating anvone who isn't right behind vou. I. and manv other concerned citizens and oolice. are oatientlv doing something oositive and
oroactive about rising crime" (Evanston Review, December 10. 1981: 17)
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The reader will recall that Whitmore had been a major actor
in the original police controversv.

In liqht of the RCPC's reaction

and interoretation of Whitnore's attempts to mobilize citizens to
demand certain concessions from the citv administration. it aopears
that the city was successful in "draining off" any inclinations for
public community protest.
In analyzing a second source of cooptation emanating from the
Resource Committee, it has been demonstrated that the Resource
Committee did have a vested interest in the RCPC's choice of crime
Prevention policv and strategies.

The Resource Committee was in need

of a "auick" evaluative study of a crime prevention strateqv imolemented in Evanston.

It was pointed out that the community newletter

provided such a study.

At this point it seems pertinent to discuss

whether this "influence" exerted by the Resource Committee and the subsequent adoption of the newsletter proposal bv the RCPC, can in fact
be considered "cooptation" as opposed to "collaboration".
Cooptation Versus Collaboration
Inherent characteristics and specific circumstances would indicate that the RCPC as an organization, would be an easy target
for cooptive strategies.

The first characteristic which RCPC members

shared was their relative ignorance in the area of crime prevention.
As previously discussed, the first two months of RCPC meetings were
devoted to an educational process by the Resource Committee.

Three

subcommittee members were charged with the primary responsibility
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of reviewing the massive amount of crime prevention literature which
the police department had accumulated and in providina a summary of
these strategies to the whole committee.

A committee composed large-

ly of members who have no "expert knowledge" on the subject for which
thev are to develoo orogram oolicv. reoresents a group which can
easily fall prey to the influences of the Resource Committee.
Ravine relativelv little orevious experience in crime prevention, the RCPC was not in a position to formulate its own policy.
Therefore RCPC members actually represented no threat to the Resource
Committee in this area.

It might be concluded that the Resource

Committee did not actually "coopt" the RCPC but rather served as a
steering committee or as a resource panel of experts which resulted
in the domination of the RCPC in choosing the first item of priority.
This domination or influence is grounded in the initial lack of knowledge of RCPC members.
In general, the RCPC was willing to allow the Resource Committee
to structure meetings and to take the initial in setting organizational
objectives.

The original intent behind the Resource Committee is

just what its name would imply--a resource for the RCPC to draw upon
in the formation of preventive strategies.

It seems appropriate at

this time to make a conceptual distinction between cooptation as an
intended strategy and cooptation as a strategy consequence.

Selznick (1949) makes this distinction in his study of the TVA.
TVA officials fully intended to coopt local voluntary associations
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by absorbing them into the TVA network.

This was done in anticioation

of overlaooine and nossiblv antithetical eoals and as a means of
securine a social base which would iustifv its indenendence from the
federal eovernment.

The consequence of this cooptive process was a

marked decrease in the TVA's control over policy and what Selznick
terms a "compromise" of democratic principles
In the case of Evanston, the conceptualization and formation of
the RCPC has already been analyzed as an "anticipatory" strategy.
Since the conceptualization had no specific body of leaders selected
for inclusion, it would appear that a case cannot be made for analyzing the proposed RCPC as an intentional cooptive strategy.
It is further argued that neither can the RCPC be considered
cooptive in it consequences.

Lack of expertise or knowledge has al-

ready been cited as a major factor which precludes the existence of
cooptation.

Three additional factors will be discussed below.

A second RCPC characteristic which would call the use of cooptation into question is the fact that none of the RCPC members knew
each other prior to the formation of this committee.

Nor were any

of the RCPC members familiar with members of the Resource Committee
(with the exception of one member).

Unfamiliarity among committee

members makes the initial formation of committee policy difficult.
The needs and concerns of each community group were not know by the
group as a whole, nor were nay needs which they might share in common.
As a result committee members were essentiallv straneers lackine a
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common base by which to make decisions.
dismiss cooptation as a consequence.

Again, this would seem to

The lack of a personal or

organizational network between RCPC members would appear to negate
the necessity of cooptation.

If organizational members had no prior

knowlege of crime prevention strategies and no history of working together, it would seem natural that the Resource Committee would ereatlv influence the direction of the RCPC.
one major resource--expertise.

The Resource Committee had

The RCPC possessed the other major

resource needed for policy formation--access to community residents.
The Resource Committee represented common ground to all committee
members.

Again, it might be concluded that the Resource Committee pro-

vided guidance and structure to an organization which would have otherwise floundered for focus in its initial stages.
Thirdly, RCPC community leaders did not come to the committee
with well-formulated goals or obiectives.

RCPC members were not aware

of the various crime prevention strategies available nor did they
have·any well formulated ideas on the need for prevention strategies
in their particular geographical areas.

A committee which does not

have well formulated goals is in need of a general sense of purpose
and direction.

This was clearly stated by a number of members at the

very first meeting.

The Resource Committee was available to provide

such direction and organization.
A fourth characteristic particular to the RCPC was a community
view which the maiority of members shared.

They were generally of
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the opinion that the RCPC would have little purpose or impact without
the express support of the city/police administrators.

Thus in their

view, it was of utmost importance that the city government legitimize
the existence of their committee and any programs which they might put
forth.
tee.

The RCPC sought this legimimation through the Resource CommitSuch a relationship would more closely approach collaboration

where a certain level of reciprocity exists between the Resource Committee and the RCPC.

This would be in opposition to cooptation which

implies that a dominant organization takes the initiative to incorporate a group which it considers to be in opposition to them.
The above discussion has centered on characteristics of the
RCPC which placed them in an initially dependent role.

This depenq-

ency then is basically due to a lack of knowledge, lack of a communication network. lack of clear cut goals and a oerceived lack of
legitimation bv the larger communitv and the citv administration.
In addition, there were the personal and organizational motives of
RCPC members which were discussed earlier.

As pointed out, these

committee members had varying reasons for being involved in the RCPC.
A large proportion of these individual goals have been met already
with the introduction of crime prevention as a community issue. inspite of the fact that many RCPC members were not in favor of the
community newsletter as the first priority.

In sum then, it has been

determined that the Resource Committee (as representatives of the
police/city administration) possess three main resources needed by the
RCPC.

These are funding, legitimacy and knowledge.
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It can thus be concluded that the RCPC represented an organization where the interests of a varietv of neonle (including the Resource
Committee) came together in the same arena.

This wide spectrum of in-

dividual and group motives is prevalent in most oreanizations.

The

Resource Committee's initially strong influence might therefore be
attributed to the fact that these four members were in possession of
the major resources needed by the RCPC--namely, the knowledge, the
finances• and an interoreanizational network of communication and
support.
In light of the above discussion, it might be concluded that the
social processes which governed the formation of the RCPC and which
guided the establishment of formal obiectives. were not cooptive in
nature.

Rather. thev represent the negotiation of organizational and

policy issues by a committee which possesses a wide variety of social
and personal interests.

Negotiation is a process inherent in any

organization and in any cooperative effort.

The variety of interests

held by RCPC members contributes to the "richness" of the committee
as a whole.

Such a variety of goals and interests is not to be

interpreted as a pluralist analysis of the RCPC.

Even though the

personal and organizational interests of individual members is so
varied, RCPC members share the common goal of improving or maintaining
the quality of life in their neighborhoods.

While each member's indivici-

ual needs or interest may not be entirely satisfied at a particular
moment in the life of the committee, each member has thus far approached the fulfillment of some goals at least partially.
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It has been asserted that the Resource Committee had specific
organizational objectives from the start.

They possessed the most

crucial resources which the RCPC needed to develop and stav alive.
These soecific

~oals

do not preclude the general goal which the Re-

source Committee holds with the RCPC as a whole.

This is the basic

interest in building a solid working relationship between the citizenry
and the police department.

While the wavs

i~

which this goal is to be

carried out in practice mav varv. the negotiation Process which results
from such a varietv of ideas is central to the work of anv committee
charged with a common goal.
The influence exerted by the Resource Committee in the initial
stages of committee formation is typical of a situation where one
faction within an organization possesses more resources and more
alternatives.

It is therefore hypothesized that the RCPC will be less

susceptible to the influence of the Resource Committee, as RCPC members
become more "educated" with regard to crime prevention strategies
and they are able to more clearly articulate their own goals and
objectives.
This study set out to determine whether cooptation was utilized
as a social process in the evolution. formation. and development of
the Residential Crime Prevention Committee.

The results of this

study indicate that the process of collaboration more closely approximates the Evanston situation.

In analvzing this case study,

theoretical and methodological problems have surfaced.

~ertain
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In reviewing the various ways cooptation has been studied and
identified earlier in this paper, it appears that the concept of cooptation has taken on a more general meaning than the meaning which
Selznick first imparted on it.

Its use has become so general, that

it becomes difficult at times to distinguish it from collaboration or
cooperation.

For example, in the case of Bielasiak's study (1981)

why should an organization specifically seeking a certain level of
expertise which it needs, be classified as cooptation (be it the
communist party or otherwise)?

How does this process differ from a

business which hires people who possess certain skills or characteristics which they are in need of?

Bielasiak may have very specific

and valid reasons for why believes cooptation has been empoyed in
his•study, but never conceptually or methodologically distinguishes
cooptation from other processes which might be operating.
Burt (1980a; 1980b) has attempted to measure cooptation mathematically.

However, he assumes that merger patterns and structural auton-

omy are empirical indicators for cooptation.

They might very well be

but they are indicators for many other processes as well.

Burt has

taken a general term (cooptation) and attempted to measure it in a
very specific business setting.

This makes the goal of generalizing

such findings difficult in other settings.
No one study has been able to offer an operationalization of
cooptation which adequately encompasses the entire meaning of the
term nor has the same meaning been transferrable from situation to
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situation.

Since two of the basic goals of sociology involve the

identification of social processes such as cooptation and the generalizability of these concepts across groups, it would appear that the
conceptualization and operationalization of cooptation in a distinguishable manner from other processes is greatly needed.
The resent discussion represents a case study which examines the
possibility of cooptation in a community organization.

The case study

approach is a slow and sometimes not easily generalizable body of data.
At the most basic level, cooptation is a method of power acquisition
and allocation.

At the present time the case study of specific power

relations appears to be the most comprehensive method of studying this
process.

However, future efforts in the area should attempt to

develop more general, comprehensive empirical indicators of cooptation
so that the measurement of this concept can proceed from an indepth
case study to a more generalizable theoretical framework.
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APPENDIX A
1.

What community organization do you represent?

2.

What geographical area does this organization cover?

3.

How many total members would you estimate your organizationa has?

4.

How many active members does your organization have during any
given period of time?

5.

Do you belong to other community based organizations? (i.e.,
church, block, business, professional).

6.

Has your organization worked with any other organizations represented on the Residential Crime Prevention Committee previously?
Which groups and on what type of projects?

7.

Has your organization previously or is your organization presently working with the Evanston Police Department?

8.

What other community issues has your organization been involved in?
(presently and in the past).

9.

If your group has a community problem or concern which requires
the attention of the Evanston City Administration, what public
office or official (s) does your organization contact or approach?

10.

If this official/office is unresponsive or unable to solve your
specific community problem, what alternative action (s) does your
organization take?

11.

Have you sought help from persons or departments in the city in
the past which you have felt to be uncooperative or unresponsive
to community needs? Please specify.

12.

Are there persons or departments within the city administration
which you feel are very responsive to citizen needs?

13.

In general, how responsive do you think the Evanston city administration is to community needs or concerns? Give examples if
posaible.

14.

In general, how responsive do you think the Evanston Police Department to citizen needs?

15.

\~at

skills or qualities do you think are important in the hiring
of a new city manager?

16.

144
What changes should be made in the way the city manager's office
deals with the public and the city council with the hiring of the
new city manager? Please compare these proposed changes with the
way the former city manager interacted witn the public and city
council.

17.

Are you an officer in your organization?

18.

How would you divide the proportions of male and female members
in your organization? (i.e. males 40%; females 60%) or give
numerical estimates if possible.

19.

How would you divide your organizational members in terms of income? What percentage would you estimate to fall in each of these
income categories?

Under $10,000
$10,000-%15,000
$15,100-$20,000
$20,100-$30,000
$30,100-$40,000
$40,100-$50,000
Over $50,000
20.

What proportion of your members has:

Less than 12 years of schooling
High School Diploma
Some College
College Degree
Some Graduate Credit
Graduate Degree
21.

How would you classify the age group of the majority of the members
belonging to your organization? Please check one.

Under 20
21-35
36-50
51-60
61-70
Over 71
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APPENDIX B
A.

B.

Crime Prevention
1.

What do you hope to accomplish by your organizations' involvement in the development of this program?

2.

How did your organization become interested in this program?

3.

What kinds of crime prevention activities is your organization currently involved in?

4.

What is your opinion of the crime situation in Evanston?

5.

What is your opinion of the crime situation in your area?

6.

How much of a problem do you thing crime is in Evanston?

Police/Community Relations
1.

Does your organization feel that the prevention of crime is:
a.
b.
c.

more the responsibility of citizens and community groups
more the responsibility of the police department
a shared responsibility of both the police department and
the citizenry.

2.

What do you expect the police department's role to be in the
development of this program?

3.

What do you expect the city administration's role to be in the
development of this program?

4.

How closely has your community organization worked with the
police department in the past? Have you:
a.
b.
c.

invited them to talk to your organization
attended presentations held by police department
reported area problems or reported suspicious events.

5.

How would you rate the overall quality of service provided by
the police department?

6.

What things would you change in the way police approach crime
prevention and the solving of crime?

C.

D.

7.
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How does your organization feel about working with the police
department to develop a crime prevention program?

8.

Do they_ see this as a beneficial possibility?

9.

Does your organization feel that most crime is committPn hv
persons outside your area or by people residing inside your
community area?

10.

Are there any particular areas in your community which your
organization considers unsafe?

Community Organization in General
1.

What other types of programs is your organization involved in?

2.

How old is the organization?

3.

Why did the organization form?

4.

How many members comprise your organization?

5.

How many are active members?

6.

How often do you meet?

7.

How many "officers" represent your organization?

8.

Do you have an executive board?

9.

How many are on it?

Residential Crime Prevention Committee
1.

How helpful has the Resource Committee been to the committee
as a whole?

2.

What individua'l members of the Resource Committee contributed
to the goals and programs of this committee?

3.

Which committee members do you find to be most informative
or productive in terms of ideas or practical suggestions?

4.

Research on other communitv organizations has found that in
order for citizens to remain involved in a committee such as
Residential Crime Prevention Committee, the participants
must be "getting" something out of it. What are you getting
out of your involvement in this committee?

5.

Has your organization worked previously with any of the
other organizations involved in this committee? With any of
the Resource Committee?
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